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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT D. MAACK and JUDITH D. MAACK,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
v.
No. 920298

RESOURCE DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
TIMOTHY HOAGLAND, and ROBERT K. JARVIK,

Priority 16
Defendants/Appellees.
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3 )(j)

(1989).

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Plaintiffs/Appellants Robert D. Maack and Judith D. Maack
("the Maacks") state that the issues presented on appeal in this
case follows (the standard for review for each of these issues is
de

novo):
1.

by

the

Does Utah recognize a negligence cause of action brought
second

owners

of

a home

against

the

builder

of

that

Have the three elements of the doctrine of res

ipsa

residence?
2.
loquitur
3.

been established in this case?
Accepting

that Utah

adopted

a products

liability

as

applied to the construction of a building, did the District Court

improperly

dismiss

the

Maacks

cause

of

action

for

products

liability against Hoagland and Resource Design based upon defects
in various component parts of the Maacks ! home?
4.

Has

or

should

Utah

adopt

the

implied

warranty

of

habitability for residential property?
5.

Is privity of contract necessary to succeed on a claim

based upon the breach of the implied warranty of habitability on
residential property?
6.

Were sufficient facts established to support the Maacks 1

negligent and intentional misrepresentation claims?
7•

Did Hoagland and Resource Design establish, as a matter

of law, that Mr. Maack was negligent by more than fifty percent,
thus barring the Maacksf claims?
8.

Is a meeting of the minds necessary in order to establish

Resource Design's implied contract claim?
9.

Do the "as is" clause, seller's warranty clause, and a

clause stating that there are no oral agreements contained in the
Earnest Money Sales Agreement, as a matter of law, eliminate the
Maacks 1 claims against the seller of the residence, Jarvik, for (1)
breach of contract;
misrepresentation;

(2) for general equitable relief;

(3) for

(4) for fraudulent concealment; and

(5) for

nondisclosure?

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances
or regulations whose interpretation is determinative in this case.
The only rules whose interpretation are relevant in this case are
U.R.C.P. 12 & 56.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW.
Throughout the course of the proceedings below, it was assumed

that certain defects existed in the construction of the residence
the Maacks purchased from Jarvik.

Essentially, the District Court

denied every motion the Maacks filed and granted every motion any
other party filed.
Pursuant to U.R.C.P. 9(b) and 12(b), on October 16, 1990,
defendants/appellees Timothy Hoagland

("Hoagland" ) and Resource

Design & Construction, Inc. ("Resource Design") filed a Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff's [sic] Second and Third Claim for Relief.1

The

District Court entered an Order on Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss,
Plaintiffs1
dated

Motion to Consolidate and the Schedule of the Case

November

8,

1991,

granting

the

Motion

to

Dismiss

the

Plaintiffs' Second Claim for Relief on the basis that the Maacks
have not and could not plead privity of contract and Utah has not

X

R. 57-59.
3

adopted any implied warranties relating to the construction of
residential

property,

including

the

implied

warranty

of

habitability.2
On February 11, 1992, the Maacks filed Plaintiffs' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment3 against Resource Design, arguing that the
record clearly establishes that there was no meeting of the minds,
and

therefore,

Design ! s

Resource

claims

for

relief

in

its

Counterclaim based upon an express or implied contract should be
dismissed.
Plaintiffs1

The Court denied

this Motion

in an Order

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and

Denying

Continuing

Plaintiffs* Motion to Exclude Defendants1 Expert Witnesses from
Testifying at Trial dated July 20, 1992.4
On

March

24,

1992,

Jarvik

filed

a

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment,5 alleging that the provisions of the Earnest Money Sales
Agreement entitled

him to summary judgment on the Maacks 1

(1)

breach of contract claim; (2) claim for general equitable relief;
(3) misrepresentation claim; (4) fraudulent concealment claim; and
(5) nondisclosure claim.

In an Order entered on May 19, 1992, the

2
0rder on Defendants* Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs1 Motion to
Consolidate,
and the Schedule of the Case 1f 2 (R. 548-51) (attached
as Exhibit f,A" ).
3

R. 1121-24.

4

R. 2286-89 (a copy is attached as Exhibit " B " ) .

5

R. 1616-32.
4

District Court dismissed all of the Maacksf claims against Jarvik.6
The basis for dismissing these claims is set forth in the Rule 52
Statement

of

Grounds

and

Order

for Granting

Defendant

Robert

Jarvik?s Motion for Summary Judgment Against Plaintiffs.7
On March 25, 1992, pursuant to U.R.C.P. 56, Resource Design
and Hoagland filed Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment seeking
to have the Maacks' claims based upon (1) strict liability; (2)
intentional and negligent misrepresentation; and (3) negligence and
res ipsa

loquitur,

dismissed upon legal grounds.8

On June 17,

1992, the District Court entered the Rule 52 Statement of Grounds
and Order Granting DefendantsT Motion for Summary Judgment Against
Plaintiffs,

dismissing

the

Maacks

strict

liability

misrepresentation claims, and negligence and res ipsa

claim,
loquitur

claims.9
B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
1.

Introduction

Hoagland and Resource Design were the general contractors for
the construction of the residence the Maacks purchased from Jarvik.
6
7

R. 2137-39 (a copy is attached as Exhibit " C " ) .

R. 2140-46 (a copy is attached as Exhibit " D " ) .

8
The District Court did not rule upon Resource Design's and
Hoagland?s claim that Hoagland was acting in his representative, as
opposed to individual, capacity.
That issue, therefore, is not
addressed in this appeal.
9

R. 2212-18 (a copy is attached as Exhibit " E " ) .
5

Their construction

practices were negligent

and

shoddy.

They

applied an inappropriate cement-based stucco to the exterior of the
residence,

when

the

plans

and

specifications

installation of a synthetic acrylic stucco.
the

cement-based

stucco

is

an

required

the

They acknowledge that

inappropriate

material

for

the

climate; they acknowledge that they failed to install necessary
expansion joints in the cement-based stucco.
leak.

The roof and decks

The roof drains and lines were improperly installed, froze,

and were severed by the contractor at ground level, allowing water
from the roof to now drain on the ground.

The walls of the shower

in the master bathroom were not properly sealed and leaked.

This

list is by no means comprehensive.10
2.

Hoagland 1 s
Residence

Agreement

with

Jarvik

to

Construct

the

Resource Design is a corporation and is a construction firm
that engages in general construction, including light commercial
and residential buildings.11
of Resource Design.12

Hoagland owns one-half of the stock

Hoagland is a licensed general contractor

Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Hoagland f s and
Resource 1Design's Motion
for Summary
Judgment
(R.
1971);
Plaintiffs
Answers to Defendant's Interrogatories (First Set)
dated October 15, 1990, Answer No. 19 (R. 1898-1903).
n

Deposition Transcript of Timothy Hoagland at 15 ("Hoagland
Depo. Trans.") (R. 1126).
12

Hoagland Depo. Trans, at 13 (R. 1126).

6

in the state of Utah.
On or about July 1, 1986, Resource Design "aka Tim Hoagland"
entered into an agreement with Dr. Robert Jarvik to construct a
house for Jarvik.14
Jarvik house.15
Form

Agreement

Hoagland was the general contractor of the

There is a dispute as to whether the "Standard
between

Owner

and

Contractor"

contract between Jarvik and Hoagland.16

was

the

entire

Further, the Standard

Form Agreement Between Owner and Contractor itself suggests that
the contracting parties are Jarvik, on the one hand, and Resource
Design and Hoagland, on the other hand.17

Resource Design began

the construction of the Jarvik house in approximately

July of

1986.18
3.

The Defects in the Stucco

The specifications on the drawings require the exterior stucco
finish for the residence to consist of a two-coat synthetic acrylic
13

Hoagland Depo. Trans, at 14 (R. 1126).

14

See Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Contractor,
dated July 1, 1986 (attached as Exhibit "F") (R. 1527-34).
15

See Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Contractor
(Exhibit "F") (R. 1527-34).
16
Jarvik produced during the course of discovery "General
Conditions of the Contract for Construction."
Deposition
Transcript of Robert Jarvik taken December 11, 1991, Exhibit 3 (R.
1972).
17

A copy of the Standard Form Agreement Between Owner and
Contractor is attached as Exhibit "F" (R. 1527-34).
16

Id.;

see

also

Hoagland Depo. Trans, at 96-98 (R. 1127).
7

stucco.

General Note No. 5 reads as follows:
EXTERIOR -- TWO COAT SYNTHETIC ACRYLIC STUCCO
(FLOAT FINISH) OVER 1" STYROFOAM BOARD SECURED
W/ MECHANICAL FASTENERS. COLOR AND FINISH BY
OWNER.
"INSULCRETE", "DRIVIT" OR EQUAL
SYSTEM.19

In April of 1986, after Hoagland was aware that the plans specified
synthetic stucco, he had numerous conversations with Jarvik about
cutting back to a less expensive cement-based stucco.20

In the

course of switching to a cement-based stucco from the specified
synthetic acrylic stucco, Hoagland claims he described to Jarvik
the deficiencies associated with the use of a cement-based stucco,
including the following facts: it has a potential for cracking, it
required the use of expansion joints, and it does not behave well
in cold, freezing climates, such as Salt Lake City.21
however,

claims

Jarvik

directed

Hoagland

not

to

Hoagland,

utilize

any

expansion joints for aesthetic reasons; Jarvik also liked the idea
that the stucco would crack.22

Jarvik denied these claims.

If Hoagland is believed, Jarvik did not disclose to the Maacks

A copy of the General Notes are attached as Exhibit "G" (R.
1963); Hoagland Depo. Trans, at 38 (lines 6-13) (R. 1949-50).
20

Hoagland Depo. Trans, at 38 (lines 9-22) (R. 1950).

21
Id.
at 39 (lines 1-12) (R. 1950); Defendants' Memorandum in
Opposition to Third-Party Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment,
Statement of Facts IF 6 (R. 1995).
22

Hoagland Depo. Trans, at 40 (lines 1-4 & 16-23) (R. 1950);
Defendants1 Memorandum in Opposition to Third-Party Defendants
Motion for Summary Judgment, Statement of Facts 1[ 6 (R. 1995).
8

(1) that a non-specified synthetic acrylic stucco was utilized in
the construction of the residence, (2) that the cement-based stucco
utilized in the construction was improper for the climate, (3) that
contrary

to

the

general

contractor's

recommendations,

Jarvik

instructed the general contractor to not utilize any expansion
joints, and (4) that the cement-based stucco would be subject to
severe cracking.23
4.

The Maacks Purchase of the Residence From Jarvik

Due to a job change, Jarvik listed the house and never lived
in it.24

Prior to executing the Earnest Money Sales Agreement,25

the Maacks were dealing with one of Eagar & Company's real estate
agents, Maclyn Kesselring.26

Kesselring showed the property which

forms the subject matter of this litigation to the Maacks and
drafted the Earnest Money Sales Agreement.27
they

executed

the

Earnest

Money

Sales

Prior to the time

Agreement,

Kesselring

"Deposition Transcripts of Robert D. Maack and Robert Jarvik
(R. 1951).
24
Affidavit of Dr. Robert K. Jarvik 1f 7 (R. 1524); Defendants'
Memorandum in Opposition to Third-Party Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment, Statement of Facts 1[ 7 (R. 1996).
25

R. 1540-43 (attached as Exhibit " H " ) .

26

Affidavit of Robert D. Maack in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment Against Defendant Robert K. Jarvik
dated March 31, 1992 1f 2 (R. 1759-62) ("Maack Affidavit");
Affidavit of Maclyn Kesselring dated April 10, 1992, 1f1f 4 & 5 (R.
1841) ("Kesselring Affidavit").
27

Maack Affidavit at 1f 3 (R. 1760).
9

represented

to the Maacks that the property was subject to a

builder's

warranty

workmanship.28

covering

defects

and

material

Kesselring told the Maacks that the

and

"builder's

warranty" meant that any defects in the construction would be taken
care of by the builder.29
As a result of Kesselring's representation, the Maacks relied
upon the warranty, and consequently, they did not exercise their
right to have the property inspected for defects in material and
workmanship.30

In the event Kesselring did not represent that

there was a builder's warranty, the Maacks would have had the house
inspected by a competent general contractor who in all likelihood
would have discovered all of the defects which are the subject of
this litigation, especially the defectively selected and applied
stucco to the exterior of the residence, which at the time the
Maacks inspected the property appeared to be in good condition.31
Absent a builder's warranty, if an inspection had occurred and the
2&
Id. at 1[ 4 (R. 1760); Robert Maack Deposition Transcript at
13-14 (R. 1849-51); Kesselring does not dispute that she told the
Maacks that the home was under a "builder's warranty" but contends
this representation was made between the time the Earnest Money
Sales Agreement (R. 1844-47) was entered into and the time of
closing. Kesselring Affidavit 1f 8 (R. 1841-42); see R. 1874-75.
29

Kesselring Affidavit 1[ 8 (R. 1842).

30

Id. at 1f 6 (R. 1760).

31

Id.
at If 7 (R. 1761); Kesselring also acknowledged that the
disclosure of the "builder's warranty" was in response to the
Maacks' inquiry about conducting an additional inspection of the
home. Kesselring Affidavit 1F 8 (R. 1841-42).
10

defects which were the subject of the lawsuit were revealed, the
Maacks either would have not closed on the sale of the Subject
Property or would have negotiated a sufficient reduction in the
sales price to cover the repairs of all of the defects.32
Furthermore, Kesselring represented to the Maacks that the
stucco in the parapet was defective and would be repaired under
warranty

by

the

builder.

In

conjunction

with

making

this

representation, however, none of the defects in the remaining
aspect of the stucco, such as the fact that it was a cement-based
stucco improper for the climate and inappropriately applied, were
revealed to the Maacks.33
5.

The Maacks Ask Hoagland to Repair Defects in His Work

In approximately

late 1988 and

1989, Mr. Maack

contacted

Hoagland on numerous occasions concerning various defects in the
house initially manifested through water leakage into the house.34
Hoagland took remedial measures in an attempt to fix the defective
conditions of the house.

At no time did Hoagland or any employee

of Resource Design discuss with the Maacks that Resource Design was

32

Maack Affidavit 1f 8 (R. 1761).

33

Admission by Jarvik (R. 1869).

34

Hoagland Depo. Trans, at 126 and 136 (R. 1127); Plaintiffs'
Answers to Defendant's Interrogatories (First Set), Answer No. 38
(R. 1922-23).
11

going to charge them for the remedial work.35
Hoagland

or any employee

At no time did

of Resource Design discuss price

estimates for the subject remedial work,36

or

Mr. Maack never said

or did anything that indicated to Hoagland that Mr. Maack expected
to pay or be charged for Resource Design's remedial work.37

There

is no written contract between Resource Design and Mr. and Mrs.
Maack.38
With

one

minor

exception

--

some

remodeling

work

in

a

closet -- the Maacks did not request Resource Design to do any
additional work.39

They only asked Hoagland to perform certain

warranty work to repair defects in the material and workmanship in
their home.40

When the Maacks requested Hoagland to perform work

that was not of a warranty nature, such as the installation of
shelving in a closet, a price for that work was negotiated and
subsequently

paid.41

Furthermore,

the

work

that

Hoagland

35

Hoagland Depo. Trans, at 127, 128, 136, 138, 139, 140, 143,
170 & 171 (R. 1127).
36

Id.

(R. 1128).

37

Hoagland Depo. Trans, at 171 (R. 1128).

38

Hoagland Depo. Trans, at 170 (R. 1128).

39

Affidavit of Robert D. Maack in Opposition to Resource
Designs and Hoagland's Motion for Summary Judgment 1f 3 (R. 1967A).
40

Affidavit of Robert D. Maack in Opposition to Resource
Designs and Hoaglandfs Motion for Summary Judgment If 3 (R. 1967A).
41

Deposition Transcript of Judith D. Maack dated December 6,
1991, at 50 (R. 1973).
12

performed on the Maacksf residence was in itself defective and did
not cure any of the problems with the residence.42

If Hoagland

had not assured the Maacks that the problems would be cured, the
Maacks would have made other arrangements which would have cured
the problems and prevented further damage,43
6.

The Defects Result in Damage to the Maacks' Personal
Property

Defects in the materials and workmanship in the residence have
allowed water to penetrate into the personal living spaces of the
Maacks.

This leaking water has destroyed some of the Maacksf

personal property, such as Mr. Maack ? s record collection.44

This

leaking water also damaged some of the Maacks? personal property,
such as a cotton sofa.45
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
All of the Maacks claims were dismissed on the basis that
their legal theories were inadequate.
only

basis

for

dismissing

them

This, of course, was the

because

there

was

substantial

4

Affidavit of Robert D. Maack in Opposition to Resource
Designs and Hoagland f s Motion for Summary Judgment If 4 (R. 1967A68 ) .
43

Plaintif fs ? Answers to Defendants' Interrogatories
Set), Answer No. 42 (R. 1926-27).

(First

44

Deposition Transcript of Robert D. Maack dated January 23,
1992, at 30-31 (R. 1974).
45

Id.; Deposition Transcript of Judith D. Maack dated December
6, 1991, at 74-75 (R. 1975).
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unrefuted evidence that defects existed in the construction of the
residence

due

to

Hoagland's

or

Resource

Design's

shoddy

construction practices or, depending upon the version of facts
believed,

Jarvik's intentional

concealment

of those

underlying

defects.
The second purchaser of a home has a cause of action against
the builder for negligence.

It is foreseeable that a home will be

constructed

by one owner

and

then

sold

statute of

limitations.

Consequently,

within

the

applicable

it is foreseeable

that

negligent construction practices will damage the second purchaser
of the home.

The limitation on the builder's liability should be

governed by the applicable statute of limitations, not arbitrary
limitations placed upon the builder's duty to a second purchaser.
Further, the doctrine of res

Ipsa

loquitur

contains three elements;

the facts in this case satisfy all three of them.
Utah

adopted

construction.
owner

may

the

doctrine

of

products

liability

in

The Utah Supreme Court previously has held that an

recover

for

defective

components

contained

construction project on a theory of products liability.

in

a

Privity of

contract is not necessary.
Although the Utah Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the
narrow issue of whether the implied warranty of habitability should
be extended to residential construction, the logic of prior cases
14

in this area dictates that the doctrine should be extended to
second purchasers of residential property.
Hoagland performed remedial repair work on the residence in an
effort to correct his negligent work. Before starting the remedial
work he suggested that there would be no charge, i.e., he would
"stand behind" his prior work and "make it right."

Later he filed

a Counterclaim alleging that the work he was performing was in fact
something for which the Maacks should pay, contrary to his earlier
representation.

The misrepresentation of a present promissory

intention is a misrepresentation of a presently existing fact,
entitling the Maacks to recover on the basis of intentional or
negligent misrepresentation.
The Maacks were entitled

to summary judgment on Resource

Design's First Claim for Relief in its Counterclaim.

The First

Claim for Relief was based upon the existence of an express or
implied contract.

Without a meeting of the minds, there can be no

express or implied contract.
Finally, representations Jarvik1s agents made to the Maacks
are binding upon Jarvik.

The provisions Earnest Money Agreement

does not relieve Jarvik from tort-based claims, such as fraudulent
concealment or intentional or negligent misrepresentation.
Utah

Supreme

Court

has

previously

recognized,

contractual

provisions cannot provide a defense against fraud claims.
15

As the

ARGUMENT
The dismissal of claims for failing to state a cause of action
and the granting of summary judgment in this case are subject to de
novo

review.46

When reviewing an Order granting summary judgment,

the facts are to be liberally construed in favor of the party
opposing the Motion and that party is to be given the benefit of
all inferences which might reasonably be drawn from the evidence.
The determination

of whether

the facts reviewed

under

such a

standard justify entry of judgment is a question of law, and a
reviewing court should accord the trial court ! s conclusions of law
no deference, but review then for correctness.47
In considering the Motions for Summary Judgment, it is not
appropriate for a court to weigh evidence or assess credibility.
The sole initial inquiry is whether there is a genuine issue of
material fact.48
purpose

and

Documentary evidence is not dispositive if the

intent

underlying

the

documents

are

at

issue.49

Furthermore, it only takes one sworn statement to dispute the

46

6 Moore's Federal Practice 1[ 56.27[1] at 56-852.

47

1991).

Clover v.

48

W.M. Barnes
59 (Utah 1981).

Snowbird
Co. v.

Ski
Sohio

Resort,
Natural

49

Id.
16

808 P.2d 1037, 1039-40 (Utah
Resources

Co.,

627 P.2d 56,

averments on the other side of the controversy and create such an
issue.50
POINT I.
IN UTAH,
MAINTAIN
ABSENCE
PERSONAL
HOWEVER,

THE MAACKS ARE ENTITLED TO
A NEGLIGENCE CLAIM IN THE
OF
PROPERTY
DAMAGE
OR
INJURY; PROPERTY DAMAGE,
DID OCCUR IN THIS CASE

A Utah Supreme Court decision recognizes the validity of a
negligence claim
construction.
Christensen

of a second owner to recover

In Good v.

Construction

Hansens in 1965,

Christensen,
Company

for defects in

527 P. 2d 223 (Utah 1974),
built

some

carports

for

the

The Hansens sold the realty to the Goods, the

plaintiffs in that case, in 1969.

In 1973, a heavy

snowfall

occurred, and the carport fell, causing damages to Goods.
In the Good case, the Utah Supreme Court stated as follows:
[A]n owner does sustain damage as soon as an
improper construction is made, and he can
bring an action against the contractor for
breach
of
contract
or
for
negligent
construction.
A failure to perform work on
any construction in a good and workmanlike
manner affords the owner a cause of action
immediately.
The stranger has no cause of
action for faulty construction until he
suffers damage to his own interest.
Id.

at 224 (emphasis added).

Consequently, as can be seen from the

proceeding quote, the Utah Supreme Court recognizes the propriety

50

Id.
17

of

a

second

contractor

owner's

for

failure

workmanlike manner.

negligence

cause

to perform

of

action

construction

against

the

in a good

and

The majority position on this issue in other
Christensen.51

states adopts this position set forth in Good v.

It is incongruous to argue that Hoagland and Resource Design
owe no duty to the Maacks.
the

house

failed,

struck

For example, if a structural beam in
Mrs. Maack,

and

severely

personally

injured her, no one would seriously contend that the contractor who
negligently installed the beam owed no duty to Mrs. Maack.

As long

as she filed her lawsuit in a timely manner within the applicable
statute of limitations and statute of repose, the contractor's duty
to Mrs. Maack would be clear:

duty would be determined on the

basis of foreseeable injury, and negligently

installing a beam

certainly could result in foreseeable injury to the occupants of
the

house.

limitation

The
on

the

statute

of

limitations

contractor's

duty

to

is the
the

only

Maacks,

relevant
not

some

contrived and artificial limitation based upon whether they were
the first or second purchasers of the home.

If it is foreseeable

that the contractor's negligence could cause damage to the Maacks,
it is an artificial limitation on its duty to make it subject to
whether the Maacks are the first purchasers of the home, the second
51

therein

Anno., Liability
of builder of residence for latent
defects
as runninq to subsequent purchasers from original
vendee §

3, 10 A.L.R.4th 385 (1981).

18

purchasers of the home, or have no financial interest in the home.
Two decisions from the Supreme Courts of sister states have
reached the conclusion that a builder of a home is liable for
damages which are foreseeable and caused by his negligence to the
second and subsequent purchaser of a home with whom he had no
contractual relationship even though the work is accepted by the
first owner before the damage becomes manifest.

In other words, a

subsequent purchaser may state a claim against a builder for latent
defects in a residence caused by the builder's negligence.52

The

states that have refused to extend the negligence cause of action
to

subsequent

purchasers

often

turn

on

jurisdiction which prevents tort recovery

case

law

in

for economic

each

loss.53

Utah precedent is not so limited.
Hoaglandfs and Resource Design's Motion for Summary Judgment
originally did not contend that they did not owe the Maacks a duty.
That issue was not raised until their reply memorandum.

Rather,

their original contention was that the Maacks could not recover socalled "economic damages" by way of a tort claim.

There is a Utah

Supreme Court decision that controls and puts to rest the issue of
whether a party may recover "economic damages" by way of a tort
52

Cosmopolitan

(Colo. 1983); Moxley
(Wyo. 1979).
53

See Cosmopolitan

Homes,
v.

Inc.

Laramie

Homes,

v.

teller,

663 P.2d 1041, 1045

Builders, Inc.,
Inc.
19

v.

Weller,

600 P.2d 733, 736
663 P.2d at 1044.

In W.R.H.,

claim.

Inc.

v.

Economy

Builders

Supply,

633 P.2d 42

(Utah 1981), the District Court granted a summary judgment against
plaintiffs based upon its finding that the plaintiffs1 claims for
breach

of warranty

limitations

and

were

that

barred

by the applicable

plaintiffs1

allegations

statute of

of

negligent

manufacture failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.

The District Court's ruling was predicated upon exactly

the same contention as is presented to the Court in this case:
that economic losses are not recoverable under a negligence theory.
In the W.R.H. , Inc.

case, between 1970 and 1972, H o m e , one of

the plaintiffs in that case, purchased large quantities of plywood
siding called Mahogason from Economy Builders.

After installing

the siding on construction projects, H o m e discovered that some of
the siding was delaminating.

On August 14, 1978, H o m e and W.R.H.,

Inc., commenced their action claiming both breach of warranty and
negligence

in the manufacture

defendants

moved

losses

were

for summary

not recoverable

District Court granted

and sale

of the siding.

judgment, claiming
under

a negligence

that

The

economic

theory.

The

the Motion, but the Utah Supreme Court

reversed, soundly rejecting this argument.
In reversing the District Court's ruling and allowing the
recovery of economic damages on the basis of a negligence claim,
the Utah Supreme Court stated as follows:
20

The basis for the application of classic negligence
concepts to protect a purchaser from economic losses was

aptly explained in State
Corp.

v. Campbell,

ex rel.

Western

Seed

Production

where the Oregon Supreme Court stated:

"The manufacturer should have a duty of
exercising due care to avoid foreseeable harm
to the users of his products. As stated by
one writer, economic loss from defective
products is fwithin the range of reasonable
manufacturer foresight * * * [and this
foreseeability] should raise at least a duty
of due care unless some compelling economic or
social or administrative reason dictates
otherwise.' . . . Not being aware of any such
reasons, we hold that [the] complaint states a
cause of action in tort . . . ."
The Oregon Court supported their extension of
negligence law into an area traditionally subject to
contract concepts by explaining:
"A buyer's desire to enjoy the benefit of
his bargain is not an interest which tort law
has traditionally been called upon to protect.
It is in this tradition that we have declined,
in the absence of fault, to impose upon remote
sellers strict liability to insure customer
satisfaction. The statutory sales law has set
out a scheme of warranty liability in which
the element of fault is irrelevant as long as
the buyer proceeds against his seller. Fault
becomes relevant where the loss of the benefit
of the bargain is traceable to the negligence
of a remote seller.
Recovery for such
negligence, because it is grounded upon fault,
falls within traditional tort rules and
presents
no
serious
conflict
with
the
statutory system of non-fault recovery under
the Uniform Commercial Code."
The economic damages suffered by W.R.H. Inc. are
recoverable in conjunction with the property damage
incurred, and the reasoning of the Oregon Supreme Court
and the allowance of a cause of action for negligent
21

manufacture to recover those damages, is more appropriate
under the present factual circumstances than the
application of the strict liability analysis found in

Clark v. International

Harvester.

. .•

Id. at 45-46 (footnotes omitted).
The W.R.H., Inc.

case rejects Resource Design's and Hoagland's

"economic loss" theory as a limitation on tort claims.
case

specifically

endorses

negligence in this case.

the

use

of

the

Maacksf

The Good
theory

of

There are no other Utah cases suggesting

otherwise.
POINT II.
THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR
APPLIES PERFECTLY TO THE FACTS
BEFORE THE COURT
The Utah Supreme Court in Kusy v.
Corp.,

681 P.2d

1235

K-Mart

(Utah 1984), defined

Apparel

the application and

effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as follows:
Res ipsa loquitur is an evidentiary rule
that permits an inference of negligence on the
part
of
a defendant
under
well-defined
circumstances. Before being entitled to such
a jury instruction, a plaintiff must show:
(1) [T]hat the accident was a kind
which, in the ordinary course of events,
would not have happened had due care been
observed; (2) that the plaintiff's own
use or operation of the agency or
instrumentality
was
not
primarily
responsible for the injury; and (3) that
the agency or instrumentality causing the
injury was under the exclusive management
or control of the defendant.
22

Fashion

7inderton
v. Montgomery,
Utah, 607 P. 2d 828,
833 (1980) (citations omitted).
One of the
purposes of the res ipsa instruction is to
"cast the burden upon
[the person who
controlled
the agency or instrumentality
causing the injury] to make proof of what
happened."
Id.
at 833, quoting Lund v.
Phillips
Petroleum
Co., 10 Utah 2d 276, 280,
351 P. 2d 952, 954 (1960). It should be noted,
however, that "[o]nce the elements of res ipsa
loquitur have been established, it merely
permits and does not compel the inference of
negligence by the fact finder." Archibeque
v.
Homrich,
88 N.M. 527, 532, 543 P.2d 820, 825

(1975).
Meridian

See
also,
Brizendlne
v. Nampa
Irrigation
District,
97 Idaho 580,

585, 548 P.2d 80, 85 (1976).
Once the plaintiff makes a prima facie
showing of the elements, he is entitled to a
res ipsa instruction. The trial court should
not
weigh
conflicting
evidence
of
the
elements; this is the jury's function.
In
order to determine the appropriateness of a
res ipsa instruction, the court must view the
evidence "in light most favorable to the

plaintiff. . . . "

Rnderton

v. Montgomery,

607

P.2d at 833.
Id.

at 1235.

This case perfectly satisfies all three elements of

the doctrine of res ipsa

loquitur.54
POINT III.

THE UTAH SUPREME COURT SPECIFICALLY
RECOGNIZES THE PROPRIETY OF AN
OWNER'S STRICT LIABILITY CLAIM FOR
DEFECTS IN CONSTRUCTION

In Ernest

Motion
Loquitur

W. Hahn, Inc.

v. Rrmco Steel

Co.,

602 P.2d 152 (Utah

Affidavit of Melvin K. Thompson in Support of Plaintiffs1
for Partial Summary Judgment on the Issue of Res
Ipsa
(R. 1771-74) ("Thompson Affidavit").
23

1979), the roof of a shopping mall, which had been operating for
only

approximately

three

months,

partially

collapsed.

The

plaintiff's prayer for relief in that case was for the cost of
restoring the collapsed area, for remedial measures required by
Murray City in the non-collapsed area of the mall, for lost amounts
claimed by the tenants while the building was closed, and for the
lost income from the tenants during that time.55

Id.

at 155.

Any

suggestion, therefore, that strict liability does not apply to the
construction of real property or that economic damages, such as the
cost of repair, are not recoverable under strict liability must be
rejected in light of the Ernest
Finally, in the W.R.H.,
cited with approval Santor
207 A.2d 305 (1965).56

W. Hahn case.
Inc.

v.

case, the Utah Supreme Court

A&M Karagheuslan,

In Santor,

Inc.,

44 N.J. 52,

the New Jersey Supreme Court

specifically allowed the recovery of economic losses under strict
liability theory similar to the factual scenario of this case.

Anno., .Recovery, under strict
or damage caused

by defects

liability

in building

and tort,

or land,

for

injury

25 A.L.R.4th 351

(1983), collects all of the cases applying or refusing to apply

All of these claimed items of damages, which the Utah Supreme
Court allowed, constitute what Resource Design and Hoagland
characterize as "economic damages."
56

W.R.H., Inc.
n. 14 (Utah 1981).

v.

Economy

Builders
24

Supply,

633 P.2d 42, 45

strict liability to buildings, such as the residence in issue in
this case.
support

Under section 3, which collects all of the cases which

the

proposition

that

recovery

would

be

allowed

to

plaintiffs under a theory of strict liability and tort for injury
or damage caused by defects in buildings or land, the treatise
cites

the

supporting

Ernest

Hahn,

W.

this

Inc.

case

proposition.

as

one

Further,

of

that

those

cases

particularly

proposition is supported by a majority of the cases which have
addressed the issue.

Cf.

id.

§ 3 with § 4.

In the Second Claim for Relief in the First Amended Complaint,
the allegations

are that

the components of

defective, e.g., stucco, adhesives, etc.
Inc.

the residence

In the Ernest

W.

are
Hahn,

case, the Utah Supreme Court adopted strict products liability

where a component part of the Valley Fair Mall, specifically a
metal truss joist, was proven to be defective.

The allegations in

the First Amended Complaint are very similar to those contained in
the Ernest

W. Hahn,

Inc.

case.

The allegations contained in the

Second Claim for Relief of the First Amended Complaint make it
clear that the strict liability cause of action is directed to both
the residence in its entirety and to its component parts such as
the membranes, stucco, and adhesives.

Focusing on the stucco as an

example, Hoagland and Resource Design did not install the specified
synthetic stucco system.

Rather, they installed a three-coat,
25

cement-based
different

stucco,

utilizing

manufacturers.

responsible

for the

the

products

Hoagland

and

of

Resource

selection of these materials

supervision of their application.

at

least

Design
and

two
were

for

the

Hoagland and Resource Design,

therefore, are in no different position than was Armco Steel in the
Ernest

W. Hahn case.

The Ernest

W. Hahn case resolves the issue

that components of a building constitute products.
As far as Hoaglandfs and Resource Design's argument that they
were not a seller is concerned, the Standard Form of Agreement
Between Owner and Contractor

-- Cost of the Work

Plus a Fee,

entered into between Jarvik and Hoagland clearly establishes that
the defendants were selling the components of the building
Jarvik on a cost plus fix fee basis.

to

The allegations forming the

basis for the strict liability claim in the First Amended Complaint
comply with the standard developed by the Utah Supreme Court in the
Ernest

W. Hahn,

case.
POINT IV.
A BUILDER'S IMPLIED WARRANTY OF
HABITABILITY DOES EXTEND TO THE
SECOND PURCHASER OF A CUSTOM-BUILT
RESIDENTIAL HOME

In its dismissal

of the Maacksf

claim

for breach of

the

implied warranty of habitability, the District Court held, as a
matter of law, that the implied warranty of habitability does not

26

extend to purchasers of custom built residential homes "because
plaintiffs have not and could not plead privity of contract and
Utah

has

not

adopted

any

implied

warranties

relating

to

the

construction of residential property."
Although the Utah Supreme Court has not squarely addressed
this narrow issue of law, recent decisions by the Utah Supreme
Court and decisions from other jurisdictions clearly support the
Maacks'

action

habitability.57
Utah

Supreme

recognized

for

breach

In Wade v.
Court

of

Jobe,

rejected

the

implied

warranty

818 P.2d 1006 (Utah 1991), the
the

rule

of

caveat

emptor

the common law implied warranty of habitability

residential leases.

Id.

of

In Jobe,

and
in

the Court held that implied

warranties are designed to protect ordinary consumers who do not
have the knowledge, capacity or opportunity to ensure that goods
they are buying are in safe condition.
Bloomfield

Motors,

Inc.,

Id.

citing

Henningson

161 A.2d 69, 78 (N.J. 1960).

v.

Similarly,

the implied warranty of habitability was adopted by the courts to
protect the consumer and to ensure decent housing.

818 P. 2d at

1010.

5

E.g.,

Investments

Wade

v.

v. Oliver,

Jobe,

818

P.2d

1006

(Utah

1991);

818 P. 2d 1018 (Utah 1991); Moxley v.

P.H.

Laramie

Builders,
Inc.,
600 P.2d 733 (Wyo. 1979); Keyes v. Guy
Bailey
Homes, Inc.,
439 So.2d 670 (Miss. 1983); Richards
v.
Powercraft
Homes, Inc.,
678 P.2d 427 (Ariz. 1984); see cases cited in footnote

60,

infra.

27

The policies underlying the implied warranty of habitability
in residential leases applies with equal, if not greater force, to
the warranty of habitability in the construction of residential
custom-built homes.

The purchase of a home is perhaps the most

important and expensive investment that a family makes.

Most

purchasers simply do not have the knowledge or expertise necessary
to discover

latent defects; they must reasonably

honesty

expertise

and

constructed

with

of

latent

the

builder.

defects,

If

the

rely

a home

purchaser

on the

is

may

poorly

well

be

subjected to a major financial catastrophe against which he has no
practical means of protecting himself.

Under this scenario, the

courts

habitability

have

extended

the warranty

of

to

protect

innocent purchasers.58
Moreover, the mere fact that the Maacks were not in privity
with the builder as the original purchasers does not preclude their
cause

of

action

habitability.59

for

In Moxley

breach
v.

of

Laramie

the
Builders,

implied
Inc.,

warranty

of

600 P.2d 733

(Wyo. 1979), the Supreme Court of Wyoming reversed dismissal of a

b8

Keyes v.

Guy Bailey

Homes,

Inc.,

59

439 So.2d 670 (Miss. 1983).

Further, the Warranty Deed transferred from Jarvik to the
Maacks all rights, title and interest in the property, including
Jarvik*s rights under an implied warranty of habitability. Utah
Code Ann. § 47-1-12 (1943) (a warranty deed conveys all "rights and
privileges thereunto belonging."); See Fuller
v. Faronlte
Theatres
Co. of Salt
Lake,
119 Utah 570, 230 P.2d 335 (1951) (a cause of
action for breach of warranty is assignable).
28

complaint based on a subsequent purchaserf s cause of action for
breach of the implied warranty of habitability and held that a
builder's implied warranty ran not only in favor of the first
purchaser but to subsequent purchasers.

Id.

at 736.

In pertinent

part, that Court held as follows:
The purpose of a warranty is to protect
innocent
purchasers
and
hold
builders
accountable for their work. With that object
in mind, any reasoning which would arbitrarily
interpose a first buyer as an obstruction to
someone equally as deserving of recovery is
incomprehensible. Let us assume for example a
person contracts construction of a home and, a
month after occupying, is transferred to
another locality and must sell.
Or let us
look
at
the
family
which
contracts
construction, occupies the home and the head
of the household dies a year later and the
residence must, for economic reasons, be sold.
Further, how about the one who contracts for
construction of a home, occupies it and, after
a couple of years, attracted by a profit
incentive caused by inflation or otherwise,
sells to another.
No reason has been
presented to us whereby the original owner
should have the benefits of an implied
warranty or a recovery on a negligence theory
and the next owner should not simply because
there has been a transfer. Such intervening
sales, standing by themselves, should not, by
any standard of reasonableness, effect an end
to an implied warranty or, in that matter, a
right of recovery on any other ground, upon
manifestation of a defect. The builder always
has available the defense that the defects are
not attributable to him.
Id.

(emphasis added).

facts in this case:

The first hypothetical is identical to the
Jarvik took a job in New York.
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Most courts that have recently considered
rejected

the issue have

a privity requirement and held that a home builder's

warranty of habitability extends to subsequent purchasers for a
reasonable length of time.60

The reasonable length of time should

be determined by the applicable statute of limitations and statute
of repose.
In short, there
Court's

refusal

to

is no principled
extend

the

basis

warranty

of

for

the

District

habitability

to

residential, custom-built homes. Similarly, the concept of privity
as a bar to recovery by subsequent purchasers on a cause of action
for implied warranty of habitability will frustrate the policies
underlying the concept of the implied warranty of habitability.
The better view is to reject the antiquated concept of privity and
adopt the rule that subsequent purchasers may pursue a cause of
action

for breach

implied

warranty of habitability

for

latent

defects discovered within a reasonable length of time after the
date of purchase.

b

E.g.,
Keyes v. Guy Bailey
Homes, Inc.,
supra;
Richards
v.
Powercrart
Homes, Inc.,
supra;
Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co. , Inc.,
264
Ind. 227, 342 N.E.2d 619^ (1976); Redarowicz
v. Ohlendorf,
441
N.E.2d 324 [ill. 1982); Hermes v. Staiano,
181 N.J. Super 424, 437
A. 2d 925 (1981); Gupta v. Ritter
Homes, Inc.,
646 S.W.2d 168 (Tex.
1983).
Blagg
v. Fred Hunt Company,
Inc.,
612 S.W.2d 321 (Ark.
1981); Terlinde
v. Neelu,
271 S.E.2d 768 (S.C. 1980); Elden
v.
SimmonsL
631 P. 2d 739 (Okl. 1981); Lempke v. Dagenais,
547 A. 2d 298
(N.H. 1988); Sewell
v. Gregory,
371 S.E.2d 82 (W. Va. 1988).
See
Anno., 10 A.L.R.4th 385 (1981).
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POINT V,
HOAGLAND
MADE
REPRESENTATIONS
DIRECTLY TO THE MAACKS PRIOR TO AND
IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE WARRANTY
WORK HE PERFORMED ON THE RESIDENCE
Hoagland made several representations to the Maacks prior to
and in conjunction with performing repair or warranty work on the
residence.

These include representations that he would

behind" his prior work and "make it right."

In conjunction with

the remedial work, the issue is not whether Hoagland
promise.

"stand

broke a

Rather, Hoagland stated that he was doing the work as

remedial work and suggested that it would be at no charge, i.e., he
would "stand behind" his prior work and "make it right."

Later, he

filed a Counterclaim alleging that the work he was performing was
in fact something

the Maacks should pay for, contrary

earlier representation.

In Galloway

v. AFCO Development

to his

Corp.,

777

P.2d 506 (Utah App. 1989), the Court stated that "[t]o be liable
for fraud, a defendant's misrepresentation must be of a presently
existing fact.
a

present

However, it is settled that a misrepresentation of

promissory

intention

presently existing fact. . . . "

is

a

misrepresentation

of

a

Id.

at 508 (footnote omitted).

Hoaglandfs representation that he would "stand behind" his work and
"make
facts.

it right" were misrepresentations

of presently

existing

Despite his assurance that he would fix the defects in the
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house without any cost to the Maacks, Hoagland nevertheless filed
a Counterclaim in this case.

Not only does this constitute a

misrepresentation of a presently existing fact, but it also would
form the basis for a claim that Hoagland never intended to perform
as he suggested.

Either way, the fraud claim against Hoagland was

properly pled.
The Utah Supreme Court in Christensen
Title

Insurance

Co.,

v.

Commonwealth

Land

666 P.2d 302 (Utah 1983), defined the tort of

negligent misrepresentation as follows:
Negligent misrepresentation is a tort
which grew out of common-law fraud.
We
defined it in Jardine
v. Brunswick
Corp.,
18
Utah 2d 378, 381, 423 P.2d 659, 662 (1967), as
follows:
Where (1) one having a pecuniary interest
in a transaction, (2) is in a superior
position to know material facts, and (3)
carelessly or negligently makes a false
representation
concerning
them,
(4)
expecting the other party to rely and act
thereon,
and
(5)
the
other
party
reasonably does so and (6) suffers loss
in that transaction, the representor can
be held responsible if the other elements
of fraud are also present. [Subdivisions
added.]
See also,
Bugan v. Jones,
Utah, 615 P.2d 1239
(1980); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552
(1965).
See generally,
1 F. Harper and F.
James, The Law of Torts, § 7.6 (1956); W.
Prosser, The Law of Torts, § 107 at 704-710
(4th ed. 1971).
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As the definition suggests, a casual
statement or gratuitous advice from a stranger
to a transaction cannot be the grounds for
negligent misrepresentation. The recipient of
such information could not reasonably rely on
it because he could hardly expect
the
representor to exercise prudence and care in
making the statement that would warrant
reliance.
If, however, the information is
given in the capacity of one in the business
of supplying such information, that care and
diligence
should be exercised
which
is
compatible with the particular business or
profession involved. Those who deal with such
persons do so because of the advantages which
they expect to derive from this special
competence.
The law, therefore, may well
predicate on such a relationship, the duty of
care to insure the accuracy and validity of
the information.
1 F. Harper & F. James, supra, § 7.6 at 546
(footnotes omitted).
Id.

at 305.

Subsequent case law demonstrates that it is not

necessary to independently establish fraud.
Co.

v.

Rollins

Brown

& Gunnel 1,

Inc.,

Prlce-Orem

Investment

713 P.2d 55, 59 n.2 (Utah

1986). 61
The allegations as pled are not allegations of a breach of
promise:

the allegations demonstrate a misrepresentation of a

material fact, i.e., that Hoagland was doing the work without cost
to the Maacks.

The Maacks were damaged by their delay in hiring a

competent contractor to repair the defective work, by accommodating

See

Dugan v.

Jones,

615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980).
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Hoagland's

schedule

and

allowing

him

to do

the remedial

work

scheduled around other projects, something they would not have to
tolerate if they were paying for the repair work, and by having to
defend against a frivolous Counterclaim.
POINT VI.
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE UPON WHICH THE
COURT COULD BASE A CONCLUSION THAT
MR. MAACK WAS NEGLIGENT
Summary

judgment

is

generally

improper

on

the

issue

of

negligence, and only in clear-cut cases, with the exercise of great
caution, should a court grant summary judgment on the issue of
negligence.62
Granting

In its Rule

Defendants'

52 Statement

Motion

for

of

Summary

Grounds
Judgment

and

Order

Against

Plaintiffs, in the second paragraph 5,63 the Court concludes that
the " [p] laintif f s ' failure to ask for a copy or written evidence of
a

f

builder's warranty,' their failure to condition the offer to

purchase the Home on the existence of a 'builder's warranty' or on
the receipt of an acceptable inspection report, especially in light
of Robert Maack f s

professional

training, clearly

shows, and a

reasonable jury cannot find otherwise, that plaintiffs did not
exercise

ordinary,

reasonable

diligence."

This conclusion

is

simply contrary to the facts in the case,
62

Kltchen

v.

Cal Gas Co.,

821 P.2d 458, 461 (Utah App. 1991).

63

R. 2216-17.
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Prior to the execution of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement,
Maclyn Kesselring

(Jarvik?s

warranty

that

existed

agent) indicated

would

take

care

that a

of

any

builder's

defects

in

construction. Trusting Kesselring certainly could not be construed
as negligence.

It was this representation that dissuaded

the

Maacks from obtaining a further inspection of the property by a
general contractor.

The fact that Mr. Maack

is an attorney,

likewise, does not mean that the Maacks' trust and confidence
placed in Kesselring was negligent.

Failing to insist that the

warranty be inserted in the Earnest Money Sales Agreement under
"Seller's Warranties" is inconclusive.

The warranty was from the

builder, Hoagland, not from the seller, Jarvik.
In addition, contributory negligence in the state of Utah is
only a bar in the event that that negligence equals or exceeds
fifty percent.64

To conclude as a matter of law that trusting

Kesselring constituted negligence in excess of fifty percent seems
to be a difficult conclusion to reach at best.

Finally, Mrs. Maack

also was a purchaser of the home and had no legal training.

The

implication from the Court's conclusion was that she was negligent
in relying upon her husband, who was merely trusting Kesselring's
representations as being accurate. The District Court's conclusion

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38 (1986).
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essentially is that anyone who trusts an oral representation and
does not obtain documentation of it is negligent per

se

in the

event that the representation turns out to be false.
POINT VII.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE
MAACKS SHOULD HAVE BEEN ENTERED ON
RESOURCE DESIGN'S FIRST CLAIM FOR
RELIEF IN ITS COUNTERCLAIM BECAUSE
IT FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE ESSENTIAL
ELEMENT OF AN EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
CONTRACT: A MEETING OF THE MINDS
Resource Design's First Claim for Relief (Breach of Contract)
in its Counterclaim obviously presumes the existence of an express
contract.
contract

Resource Design concedes that
between

the Maack

and

itself.65

there

is no

Undisputed

written
material

facts established that there was no oral contract between Resource
Design and the Maacks.
An oral contract exists only where there is a meeting of the
minds of the parties.66

Here, Resource Design has the burden of

proof to show the existence of a contract between Resource Design
and the Maacks.67
6b

See Hoagland Depo. Trans, at 170 (R. 1128).

66

B & R Supply
Co. v. Bringhurst,
503 P.2d 1216, 1217 (Utah
1972) (it is an elemental principle that the creation of a contract
requires a meeting of the minds;.
61
Oberhansly
v. Earle, 572 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah 1977) (burden
of proving existence of contract is on the party seeking to enforce
it); Nuhn v. Broadbent,
507 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1973) (plaintiff
must show by a preponderance of the evidence a meeting of the
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Resource Design asserts

the existence of a contract between

the Maacks and itself wherein Resource Design agreed to do certain
"construction work" in return for payment and Mr. and Mrs. Maack
requested Resource Design to do certain "construction work" and Mr.
and Mrs. Maack agreed to pay Resource Design for said work.69
Hoagland's

testimony

establishes

that

there

was

contract between Resource Design and Mr. and Mrs. Maack.
testified

oral

Hoagland

that neither he nor any other agent or employee of

Resource Design orally
remedial

no

work

for

agreed

$16,985.00

with
or

the Maacks
for

to perform

payment.70

the

Hoaglandfs

testified there was no discussion with the Maacks, at any time,
that the Maacks were to be charged for the remedial work that is
the subject of Resource Design's counterclaim:
Q:
Tim, would you tell us, please, was there
ever a discussion between you, me [Robert
Maack], or Judy [Maack], or any of your
employees about being paid for the work that
you were doing at the house?

minds).
68

Counterclaim at irif 4 and 6 (R. 16).

69

Resource Design's breach of contract claim tellingly omits
any allegation that the parties agreed upon the amount, or form, or
calculation of compensation for the alleged "construction work."
See Counterclaim at irif 4-7 (R. 16).
70

Hoagland Depo. Trans, at 143 (R. 1130).
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A:
There were no discussions
no.71

about

that,

In fact, Hoagland stated that he worked on the house without charge
to the Maacks initially.72

His unexpressed hope was if the repair

work became too extensive other parties would pay for or share in
the cost:
Q:
Do you recall, in any or your contacts
with Mr. Maack, any discussion between the two
of you about a bid, a cost estimate or the
fact that he was going to pay for any of the
work associated with this remedial work?
A:
The initial work that I did, I did
basically as a courtesy in response to a
fairly impending problem. I mean, he [Maack]
was having some leaks in his house. The issue
of cost of repair was never brought up.
It
was my expectation that if things went too
far, that I would get compensation or share
the burden of cost for repair with other
parties.73
Hoagland 1 s own testimony conclusively establishes the absence of a
meeting of the minds between the parties.

Moreover, Hoagland ? s

unexpressed "hope" that at some indeterminate time he would begin
to charge various parties in order to continue to perform his
remedial

work

does

not

unilaterally

form

an

express

contract between the Maacks and Resource Design.

71

or

oral

As the Utah

Hoagland Depo. Trans, at 143; see Hoagland Depo. Trans, at
127, 128, 136, 138, 139, 140, 150, 170 & 171 (R. 1127).
72

Hoagland Depo. Trans, at 140 (R. 1131).

73

Hoagland Depo. Trans, at 140-41 (R. 1131).
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Supreme Court stated:
It is a basic principal of contract law there
can be no contract without a meeting of the
minds of the parties which must be spelled out
either expressly or impliedly with sufficient
definiteness to allow enforcement.74
Furthermore, the intentions of the parties are controlling
determining the terms and existence of a contract.75

in

Clearly,

Hoaglandfs own unexpressed intentions, even if divined by other
parties, would not support the existence of the contract that
Resource Design alleged in its Counterclaim.
POINT VIII.
RESOURCE DESIGN'S COUNTERCLAIM FAILS
TO ASSERT A CLAIM FOR RELIEF FOR
BREACH OF AN IMPLIED CONTRACT
Resource Design admits that there was no express contract
between Resource Design and the Maacks.76

Having conceded the

lack of a written or oral contract, Resource Design then claimed
that its breach of contract claim is really a claim for breach of
implied

contract.

Resource

Design's

however, does not set forth a claim

First

Claim

for Relief,

for breach of an implied

74

0i>erhansly, 572 P. 2d at 1386.

75

Id.

76

Defendantfs Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs1 Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment at 4 (R. 1312).
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contract.77

Clearly, Resource Design's First Claim for Relief is

for breach of contract (express) and does not plead the elements of
an implied contract. While inventive, Resource Design cannot amend
its counterclaim by way of a memorandum in opposition to partial
summary judgment.
recharacterize

Notwithstanding Resource Design's attempt to

its claim or inaugurate a claim

for relief

for

breach of an implied contract, such claim fails as a matter of law.
Resource Design erroneously argued that an express meeting of
the minds is irrelevant to determining the existence of an implied
contract.78

Repeating the well-established rule of law, the Utah

Supreme Court stated in Morgan

v.

Board

of

State

Lands,

549 P. 2d

695, 696 (Utah 1976), that a meeting of the minds of the parties is
essential to a finding that an implied contract existed.79

Here,

Resource Design failed to aver facts to establish a meeting of the
minds and even implicitly concedes that there was no meeting of the
minds of the parties. Therefore, there exists no disputed material
fact that precludes the Court from granting the Maacks' motion for
partial summary judgment.

77

Counterclaim 1Mf 3-7 (R. 17).

78
Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment at 5 (R. 1313).
79

See Lirtzman
v. Fuqua Indus.,
Inc.,
677 F.2d 548, 551 (7th
Cir. 1982) (an implied-in-fact contract requires, like an express
contract, that the parties' minds must meet through offer and
acceptance, and the contract must be definite in its terms).
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Finally, in an effort to create a material fact in dispute,
Resource Design interjects the affidavit of Mr, Timothy Hoagland in
which

he

states belatedly

that

Resource

Design

performed

its

remedial work with the intent that the Maacks were to compensate
it.

Hoagland?s statement of intent is contradicted by his earlier

deposition testimony.80
contradicts

his

Hoagland cannot submit an affidavit that

sworn

deposition

testimony.81

Subsequent

decisions in the State of Utah have followed this rule and have
refused, under similar circumstances to this case, to allow a
factual issue to be created on a motion for summary judgment by
statements

in

an

affidavit

which

contradict

deposition

testimony.82
Further, Hoaglandfs self-serving declaration was inadmissible
for determining intent for purposes of the instant motion.83

In

fact, Hoagland testified that the Maacks did not ever do anything
that led him to believe that they intended to pay Resource Design
80

Hoagland Depo. Trans, at 127, 128, 136, 138, 139, 140, 141,
143, 170 and 171 (R. 1127).
81

Wei>ster v.

Sill,

675 P.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983).

B2

Guardlan
State
Bank v. Humpherus,
762 P. 2d 1084 t 1087 (Utah
1988); Gaw v. UDOT, 798 P.2d 1130, 1136 (Utah App. 1990); Floyd v.
Western
Surgical
Associates,
Inc.,
773 P.2d 401, 403 (Utah App.
1989).
83

Brown v. General
Ins.
Co. of America,
70 N.M. 46, 369 P.2d
968, 971 (1962) ("Self-serving declarations regardless of relevancy
or materiality are incompetent."); King v. United States,
641 F.2d
253, 263 (5th Cir. 1981) (court is not bound to accept self-serving
statements as to intent).
41

or expected to be charged for Resource Design's remedial work.
Further, the undisputed testimony shows that the Maacks did not
know that Resource Design expected to be paid for the remedial work
it performed.
POINT IX.
THROUGH HIS AGENT, ROBERT K. JARVIK
NEGLIGENTLY AND FALSELY REPRESENTED
TO THE MAACKS THAT A BUILDER'S
WARRANTY EXISTED UPON WHICH THE
MAACKS REASONABLY RELIED TO THEIR
DETRIMENT
There can be no dispute that the real estate agent in this
case, Eager & Company, and its agent, Kesselring, are agents of the
seller, Jarvik.85

Kesselring made certain representations to the

Maacks prior to the time they purchased the residence, including
but not limited to the fact that a builder's warranty existed on
the property.

Hoagland

and Resource Design contend

that this

representation was false, and the Maacks have no ability to prove
otherwise.

The Maacks reasonably relied upon this representation.

The fact that a builder's warranty does not exist has caused them
considerable damage.
The Utah Supreme Court in Chrlstensen
Title

Insurance

Co.,

v.

Commonwealth

Land

666 P.2d 302 (Utah 1983), defined the tort of

84

Hoagland Depo. Trans, at 171 (R. 1128).

85

Earnest Money Sales Agreement between Maack and Jarvik dated
July 27, 1988 1f 10; Kidd v. Maldonado,
688 P. 2d 461 (Utah 1984).
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negligent misrepresentation.

The language in which it did so is

quoted on pages 32-33, supra.

Subsequent case law demonstrates

that it is not necessary to independently establish fraud.86
In Dugan v.

Jones,

615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980), the third-party

plaintiffs were real estate purchasers who had been told by a
third-party defendant, a real estate agent, that the property they
were purchasing comprised 22.75 acres, when in fact it comprised
only 6.9 acres.

The Utah Supreme Court in that case held that a

claim for relief for negligent misrepresentation lies in tort in
under those facts.

The facts in the instant case likewise clearly

establish the elements of negligent misrepresentation.
POINT X.
ONCE HE MADE A PARTIAL DISCLOSURE
RELATING TO THE DEFECTIVE NATURE OF
THE STUCCO ON THE PARAPETS, JARVIK
WAS UNDER A DUTY TO DISCLOSE TO THE
MAACKS ALL DEFECTS IN THE STUCCO
Through his agent, Jarvik told the Maacks that the stucco on
the parapets around the garage was defective.

He also represented

that he would fix this defect in this portion of the stucco.

He,

however, did not disclose the remaining defects in the stucco,
including the improper utilization of a cement-based stucco, a
material

bb

inappropriate

Prlce-Orem

Investment

for

this

climate,

Co. v. Rollins

713 P.2d 55, 59 n.2 (Utah 1986).
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and

the

improper

Brown & Gunnell,

Inc.,

application of that cement-based stucco without expansion joints.
The stucco system was doomed to fail.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551(2)(b) states as follows:
One party to a business transaction is
under a duty to exercise reasonable care to
disclose to the other before the transaction
is consummated,

matters known to him that he knows to be
necessary to prevent his partial or ambiguous
statement of the facts from being misleading.

The Utah Supreme Court in First
Bamberry

Development

Corp.,

Security

786 P.2d

Bank

of

Utah,

1326, 1330-31

N.A.

v.

(Utah 1990)

specifically adopted this section of the Restatement.
Jarvik f s partial disclosure relating to the stucco, while
failing to disclose other defects in the stucco of which he was
acutely aware, subjects him to liability for nondisclosure.
POINT XI.
JARVIK IS LIABLE TO THE MAACKS FOR
FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT
The "as is" clause in the Earnest Money Sales Agreement does
not

eliminate

Jarvikfs

liability

for

either

agreements or for his fraudulent concealment.87

87

See
(1967).

Tibbitts

v.

Openshaw,

the

collateral

Jarvik

cannot

18 Utah 2d 442, 425 P.2d
44
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stand behind a "as is" provision as a shield to his fraudulent
concealment or his collateral agreements.
In order to prevent them from obtaining an inspection of the
property, Jarvik represented to the Maacks that the property was
under a builder's warranty.

An inspection by a general contractor,

as the Maacks intended, would have revealed the defects in the
stucco and other parts of the residence.88
of Torts § 550 entitled

Restatement (Second)

"Liability for Fraudulent Concealment"

reads as follows:
One party to a transaction who by concealment
or other action intentionally prevents the
other from acquiring material information is
subject to the same liability to the other,
for pecuniary loss as though he had stated the
nonexistence of the matter that the other was
thus prevented from discovering.
If Jarvik had not represented to the Maacks that a builder's
warranty would cover all defects in materials and construction, the
Maacks would have had the house inspected by a competent general
contractor.
Jarvik?s
obtaining

This would have revealed the defects in controversy.

action
an

in

intentionally

inspection

of

the

dissuading
property

the

Maacks

subjects

Jarvik

from
to

liability to the Maacks for fraudulent concealment.
Further, even absent Jarvik's interference in obtaining an

Thompson Affidavit (R. 1771-74).
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inspection of the property, the defects concerning the stucco in
terms of its selection and application were not reasonably within
the

knowledge

of

both

parties.

In

this

situation,

misrepresentation may be either by affirmative statement or by
material omission.

Jarvik was obviously in possession of the facts

relating to the inadequate materials and application of the stucco.
His failure to disclose that information constitutes an actionable
fraud.89
In Moore v.

Swanson,

556 P. 2d 1249 (Mont. 1976), plaintiff

Moore, as buyer, brought an action against defendants Swanson, as
sellers, to rescind a contract or alternatively to recover money
damages.

Moore was purchasing the Alpine Village Motel.

During

the negotiations, defendants specifically told plaintiff that the
motel

fully

complied

with

Triple A

standards.

The contract,

however, only required plaintiff to maintain the hotel's membership
with the American Automobile Association during the term of the
contract and had no affirmative language that the motel met a
Triple A rating.

Before the plaintiff took possession of the

premises, defendants received a written deficiency notice from the
Association that certain improvements were required, and defendants
did

not

89

communicate

Sugarhouse

this

Finance

information

Co. v. Anderson,

1980).
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to

the

plaintiff.

The

610 P. 2d 1369, 1373 (Utah

defendant raised the "as is" disclaimer clause in the contract as
a bar to plaintiff's recovery of repair damages to bring the motel
into compliance with the Triple A standards.

The Supreme Court of

Montana rejected the argument, stating:
The "as is" disclaimer clause regarding
condition of premises does not bar plaintiff's
recovery of repair damages.
Defendants
represented to plaintiff that the motel was in
all respects in compliance with Triple A
standards, when in fact it was not.
The
district
court
correctly
found
this
representation
to
be
material
to
the
transaction and a matter contributing to a
partial
failure
of
consideration
on
defendants' part.
Therefore, damages are
appropriate to compensate the plaintiff. . . .
Id. at 1253.
Furthermore, in Lusk Corp. v.

Burges,

85 Ariz. 90, 332 P.2d

493, the Arizona Supreme Court recognized that "it is . . . a wellsettled

rule that a person cannot

free himself

from

fraud by

incorporating a clause like the one above [an integration clause]
in a contract. . . . "

Id.

at 495.

In that case, the contract

between the parties contained a provision that it covered

all

agreements expressed or implied between the parties.
Likewise in P.E.A.C.E.

Corp.

v.

Oklahoma

Natural

Gas Co.,

568

P. 2d 1273 (Okl. 1977), the Oklahoma Supreme Court found that a
"waiver of defense" clause in a contract would apply only to an
action

on

the

contract,

and

not

47

to

a tort

cause

of

action,

including a tort based upon fraudulent misrepresentation.

Id.

at

1276.
There is no case law supporting Jarvik's position that the
contractual language in the Earnest Money Agreement bars the tortbased causes of action.
POINT XII.
THE DOCTRINE OF MERGER DOES NOT
EXTINGUISH THE UNDERLYING CLAIMS
BASED UPON FRAUD
The doctrine of merger is set forth in paragraph 0 of the
Earnest Money Sales Agreement.
G.G.R.,

Inc.

v.

Leventls,

The Utah Court of Appeals

in

773 P.2d 841 (Utah App. 1989), described

the exceptions to the doctrine of merger as follows:
The doctrine of merger provides that upon
delivery and acceptance of a deed, the
provisions of the underlying contract for the
conveyance
are
deemed
extinguished
or
superseded by the deed. Secor v. Knight,
716
P. 2d 790, 792 (Utah 1986). However, there are
several exceptions to this doctrine, including
fraud, mistake and existence of collateral
rights in the contract of sale.
Id.
at
793. . . .
Id.

at 844 (emphasis added).
The two claims against Jarvik for fraudulent concealment both

came under the fraud exception of the merger doctrine.

The cause

of action based upon breach of contract and breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing are collateral rights in the contract
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of sale.
The best evidence that the agreements set forth in the First
Claim for Relief in the First Amended Complaint are collateral is
the other collateral agreements into which the parties entered,
including the agreement to fix the defective stucco on the parapet
and the agreement to fix the punch list of items prior to closing.
CONCLUSION
A second purchaser of a home has a cause of action against a
contractor

who

engages

in

shoddy

and

negligent

practices, resulting in defects in the home.

construction

Generally speaking,

a home is the single largest personal investment any individual
undertakes.
subject

to

To suggest that this substantial investment is not
the

normal

laws

by

which

everyone

else

governs

themselves -- such as negligence and strict liability -- undermines
the security of that investment for every homeowner in the state of
Utah who purchased their home from a prior owner.

The implied

warranty of habitability also should protect that investment.
There was no meeting of the minds between the Maacks and
Resource

Design

concerning

the

payment

for

remedial

repairs.

Consequently, Resource Design's claims in its Counterclaim

for

breach of express or implied contract must fail.

See Resource

Management Co. v. Western

706 P.2d 1028, 1037-38 (Utah 1985).
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Ranch & Livestock

Co. ,

Jarvik made certain representations to the Maacks that the
home was covered by a builder's warranty.

He knew of defects in

the home, including the improper application of a cement-based
stucco

which

climate.
shield

was

an

inappropriate

building

material

He, however, concealed those defects.
himself

from

these

misrepresentations

for

this

In an effort to
and

fraudulent

concealment, Jarvik relies upon contractual provisions, such as the
"as

is"

provision

and

the

doctrine

of

merger.

Contractual

provisions, however, cannot shield a party from tort-based claims.
To adopt such a policy essentially would sanction fraud.
This Court should reverse the District Court Orders dismissing
the Maacks1 claims for relief against Hoagland, Resource Design and
Jarvik and remanding those claims for trial.

Further, this Court

should reverse the District Court's denial of the Maacks 1 Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment on Resource Design's Counterclaim's
First Claim for Relief.
Dated:

November 23, 1992.
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS

Mu, A.

faaittc A. L a r s e n
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
Robert D. Maack and Judith D. Maack
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Pursuant

to

Rule

21(d)

of

the

Utah

Rules

of

Appellate

Procedure, I hereby certify that I caused four true and correct
copies of the BRIEF OF APPELLANT to be mailed to the following
individuals on November 23, 1992:
K.M. Frankenburg, Esq.
WILLIAMS & HUNT
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
P.O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
Robert K. Jarvik, M.D.
124 West 60th Street
New York, New York 10023

>^a)^
data\maack\appellant.brf
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ADDENDUM

Exhibit "A"

Order on Defendants 1 Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs'
Motion to Consolidate, and the Schedule of the

Case.

(R. 548-51)

Exhibit "B"

Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment and Continuing Plaintiffs' Motion
to Exclude Defendants' Expert Witnesses from
Testifying at Trial. (R. 2286-89)

Exhibit "C"

Judgment.

Exhibit

M ,f

D

Exhibit "E"

Exhibit "F"

(R. 2137-39)

Rule 52 Statement of Grounds and Order for Granting
Defendant Robert Jarvik's Motion for Summary
Judgment Against Plaintiffs. (R. 2140-46)
Rule 52 Statement of Grounds and Order Granting
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Against
Plaintiffs. (R. 2212-18)
Standard
Form
Agreement
Contractor. (R. 1527-34)

Between

Exhibit MG'f

General Notes from contract drawings.

Exhibit "H"

Earnest Money Sales Agreement.
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(R. 1963)

(R. 1540-43)

Tab A

NOV 0 8 1991

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT D. MAACK and
JUDITH D. MAACK,

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS1
MOTION TO DISMISS, PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE, AND
THE SCHEDULE OF THE CASE

Plaintiffs,
v.
RESOURCE DESIGN &
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Utah
corporation and
TIMOTHY HOAGLAND, an
individual

Civil No. 900903201CV
Defendants.
Judge Pat B. Brian
RESOURCE DESIGN &
CONSTRUCTION, INC. a Utah
corporation, and TIMOTHY
HOAGLAND, an individual
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
v.
ROBERT JARVIK, M.D.,
Third-Party Defendants.
On October 25, 1991, the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second
and Third Claims for Relief and Plaintiffs' Motion to Consolidate
came on for hearing before the above-captioned Court, the Honorable
Pat B. Brian presiding.

Robert D. Maack and Martin R. Denney

appeared and represented plaintiffs.

Kurt M. Frankenburg appeared

O0°C4S

and

represented

defendants.

John

B.

Maycock

represented third-party defendant Robert Jarvik.

appeared

and

Based upon the

argument of counsel, the Motions and Memorandum filed in support
and opposition thereto, and the Court being fully advised, it is
hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows:
1.

An Objection to the Proposed Order was filed and resolved

by telephonic conference on November 7, 1991; by executing this
Order on the "Approved as to form" line, each party preserves his
objections,

but

acknowledges

Court f s

the

resolution

of

the

objections are reflected in this Order.
2.
of

Because plaintiffs have not and could not plead privity

contract

and

Utah

has

not

adopted

any

implied

warranties

relating to the construction of residential property, defendants1
Motion

to Dismiss

the Plaintiffs1

Second

Claim

for Relief

is

granted with prejudice and without leave to amend.
3.

Because plaintiffs have not plead misrepresentation with

specificity, defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Third Claim for
Relief is granted without prejudice and with leave to amend the
Complaint.
4.
First

Plaintiff's oral motion to state additional claims in the
Amended

Complaint

is

granted

only

to

the

extent

that

plaintiffs are granted leave to amend the Third Claim for Relief;
to state additional claims, plaintiffs must file a Motion to Amend.
2

5.

Plaintiffs' Motion to Consolidate is denied on the sole

ground that the defendant Robert Jarvik has not been served in
Civil No. 910905638CN.
6.

All written discovery is to be completed on or before

December 20, 1991, at 5:00 p.m.; written discovery shall be served
sufficiently in advance to require responses by that deadline.
7.

All dispositive motions are to be filed on or before

December 24, 1991 at 5:00 p.m. (with service by hand delivery if
the motions are filed on that date).
8.
parties

Prior
are

to

to

the

engage

Pre-Trial
in

Conference,

meaningful

counsel

discussions

and

the

regarding

settlement and candidly assess the strengths and weaknesses of each
of their cases.
9.

Counsel and parties shall attend a Pre-Trial Conference

on January 9, 1992, at 8:30 a.m.
10.

The trial in this case is set for the five (5) days

beginning on January 27, 1992, at 9:00 a.m.
DATED:

November

7\

1991.
BY THE COURT:

District Court Judge

3

oo n rro

Approved as to form:
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS

-fa&fos
<ooert S. Campbell, Jr.
Martin R. Denney
Mark A. Larsen
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
WILLIAMS & HUNT

Gary B. Ferguson
Kurt M. Frankenburt
Attorneys for Defendants
JOHN B. MAYCOCK LAW OFFICES

Jofcn B. Maycock
j
A£>corney for Third-Party Defendant

maack\order2.mot
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GARY B. FERGUSON (A1062)
KURT M. FRANKENBURG (A5279)
WILLIAMS & HUNT
Attorneys for Defendants
and Third-Party Plaintiffs
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
Post Office Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
Telephone: (801) 521-5678

FILES DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

JUL 2 0 1992
By.

Deputy Clark

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT D. MAACK and JUDITH
MAACK,

vs.

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND CONTINUING
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO EXCLUDE
DEFENDANTS' EXPERT WITNESSES
FROM TESTIFYING AT TRIAL

RESOURCE DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION,
INC., a Utah corporation, and
TIMOTHY HOAGLAND, an
individual,

Civil NO. 900903201CV

Plaintiffs,

Defendants.

Hon. Pat B. Brian

RESOURCE DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION,
INC., a Utah corporation,
and TIMOTHY HOAGLAND, an
individual.
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs,
ROBERT JARVIK, M.D.
Third-Party Defendant.

On April 8, 1992 at 1:00 p.m., Plaintiffs' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and Motion to Exclude Defendants' Expert
Witnesses from Testifying at Trial came on for hearing before the

0C2286

above-captioned court, the Honorable Pat B. Brian presiding.
Mark A. Larsen appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs.

Kurt M.

Frankenburg appeared on behalf of defendants Resource Design &
Construction, Inc. and Timothy Hoagland.

Paul D. Newman appeared

on behalf of third-party defendant Eagar & Company.

Robert K.

Jarvik appeared telephonically on his own behalf.
Having reviewed the pleadings, memoranda and affidavits on
file and having heard oral argument presented on behalf of all
parties, and good cause appearing, the Court finds as follows:
1.

Work was requested by the plaintiffs.

2.

Work was performed by defendant Resource Design

pursuant to plaintiffs' requests.
3.

Subsequent to the performance of the work Resource

Design submitted a bill to plaintiffs.
4.

Prior to the performance of the work plaintiffs and

defendant Resource Design had no conversations as to whether or
not the work was being performed pursuant to a warranty or other
agreement, either between the builder and the plaintiffs or the
builder and some third party.
5.

A dispute exists as to whether Resource Design

performed the work expecting to be paid and whether plaintiffs
knew or should have known that Resource Design expected to be
paid for the work performed.
6.

The Counterclaim of defendant Resource Design &

Construction, Inc. is adequate to meet the notice requirements in
this jurisdiction.
2

0022

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED AND ADJUDGED:
1.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

relating to the First Cause of Action in defendant Resource
Design & Construction, Inc.'s Counterclaim is denied.
2.

Plaintiffs' Motion to Exclude Defendants' Expert

Witnesses is continued pending resolution of defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment scheduled for hearing on May 6, 1992.
DATED this

<&L

day of

1992.

t^

HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN ' //J$^
District Court Judge

5ATNA.0009U2366
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

ss,
)

Mary C. Wardell, being duly sworn, says that she is employed
by the law offices of Williams & Hunt, attorneys for
Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs herein; that she served the
attached ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND CONTINUING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO EXCLUDE DEFENDANTS'
EXPERT WITNESSES FROM TESTIFYING AT TRIAL (Case No. 900903201CV,
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County) upon the parties
listed below by placing them in an envelope addressed to:
Robert K. Jarvik, M.D. (Via First Class Mail)
124 West 60th Street
New York, New York 1002 3
Robert D. Maack (Via Hand Delivery)
Mark A. Larsen
Campbell, Maack & Sessions
One Utah Center, 13th Floor
2 01 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Paul D. Newman, Esq. (Via Hand Delivery)
SNELL & WILMER
Attorneys for Eagar & Company, Inc.
60 E. South Temple, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
and causing them to be mailed via First Class Mail, with postage
prepaid thereon, or personally hand delivered as indicated above,
on the JO
day of April, 1992.

CckdiA.
KaryfCJ

Wardell

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me thi
1992.
NOT/
Residing in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah
Notary PUDIIC
Public
Notary
•
SHARON M. ALLHANDS 1
257 East 200 So, Suite 500 |
Salt Lake City, Utah 8414f
My Commission Expires
August 8,1 993
|
State of Utah
.
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FILED MSTRiGT COURT
Third Judicial District

MAY 1 9 1992
R o b e r t J a r v i k , M.D.
124 W 60 S t r e e t
New York, NY 10023
T e l e p h o n e : (212) 2 6 5 - 8 1 7 2

M

Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT D. MAACK and JUDITH
D. MAACK,

*

JUDGEMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
RESOURCE DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION
INC., a Utah Company, and
TIMOTHY HOAGLAND, an
individual
Defendants.
ROBERT D. MAACK and JUDITH
D. MAACK
Plaintiffs

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

Civil No. 900903201CV
Consolidated Cases
Hon. Pat B. B r i a n

*
*
*
*

vs.

it

ROBERT JARVIK, M.D.

*
*

Defendant
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The Court, having made its rule 52 Statement and Order,
which are incorporated herein by this reference, hereby enters
judgement against Plaintiffs for no cause of action, on each and
every claim asserted against Defendant Robert Jarvik. Pursuant to
Rule 54(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, costs are awarded to
defendant Jarvik in the amount of $ v

.

Pursuant to defendant's affidavit submitted in accord with
Rule 4-505, the Court awards legal fees in the amount of $

S

to defendant Jarvik.

DATED this 11th day of May, 1992.

BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE PAT B^-^KIAN
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDG
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument was mailed, first class, postage prepaid on
this 11th day of May, 1992, to the following:
Mark A. Larsen
Campbell, Maack & Sessions
One Utah Center — 1300
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
K.M. Frankenburg, Esq.
Williams & Hunt
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
PO Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
Michael F. Heyrend # 1480
310 "E,f Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84103

5^^11M$:

Paul D. Newman
Snell & Wilmer
60 East South Temple, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

j*>
Robert Jarvik, M.D.
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Robert Jarvik, M.D.
124 W 60 Street
New York, NY 10023
Telephone: (212) 265-8172
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT D. MAACK and JUDITH
D. MAACK,

*
*

RULE 52 STATEMENT OF
GROUNDS AND ORDER FOR
GRANTING DEFENDANT ROBERT
JARVIK1S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT AGAINST
PLAINTIFFS

*

Plaintiffs,
vs.
RESOURCE DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION
INC., a Utah Company, and
TIMOTHY HOAGLAND, an
individual
Defendants.
ROBERT D. MAACK and JUDITH
D. MAACK

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

Consolidated Cases
Hon. Pat B. Brian
Civil No. 900903201CV

*

Plaintiffs

vs.
ROBERT JARVIK, M.D.
Defendant
1.

*
*

The Motion for Summary Judgement filed by Defendant Robert

Jarvik

("Jarvik") on

or about March

24, 1992, came on for

hearing before the Court, pursuant to notice, on May 7, 1992,
Plaintiff Robert D. Maack was present and represented by counsel,
Mark A. Larsen, Plaintiff Judith D. Maack was represented by
1
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counsel,

Michael

F.

Heyrend,

Defendant

Resource

Design

&

Construction, Inc. ("Resource Design") and Timothy Hoagland were
represented

by

counsel, Kurt M. Frankenburg,

represented

himself

and

participated

over

Defendant Jarvik

the

telephone,

and

Third-Party Defendant Eagar & Company was represented by counsel,
Paul D. Newman. The Court, having reviewed the memoranda filed by
the

parties

and

considered

the

arguments

presented

at

the

hearing, bases its decision on the following grounds:

2.

There is no genuine dispute with respect to the following

material facts:
A.
During 1986, Jarvik entered a contract with Resource
Design for the construction of a home (the "Home") located on Lot
N. 5, White Hill Estates, Phase 2, which was substantially
completed by August, 1987.
B.
Jarvik entered into sales-agency contracts for the
sale of the property with Eagar on November 4, 1987, and April
14, 1988.
C.
Plaintiffs executed an Earnest Money Sales Agreement
("Agreement") on July 26, 1988, whereby they offered to purchase
the Home from Jarvik.
D.

Jarvik accepted and signed the Agreement on July 27,

1988.
E.
The
provisions:

Agreement

contains

the

following

pertinent

(1) 1(e) Buyer Inspection. Buyer has made a
visual inspection of the property and subject to
Section 1(c) above and 6 below, accepts it in its
present physical condition, except: none.
(2) 6. SELLER'S WARRANTIES. In addition to warranties
contained in Section C, the following items are also
warranted: [blank]
(3) 7. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES.
This offer is made subject to the following special
2
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conditions and/or contingencies which must be satisfied
prior to closing: This offer may be accepted in
counterpart.
(4) 11. GENERAL PROVISIONS. UNLESS OTHERWISE
INDICATED ABOVE, THE GENERAL PROVISIONS SECTIONS ON THE
REVERSE SIDE HEREOF HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE BUYER AND
SELLER AND ARE INCORPORATED INTO THIS AGREEMENT BY
REFERENCE.
F.
The Agreement contains the following pertinent General
Provisions:
(1) B. INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated,
Buyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said property
upon Buyer's own examination and judgement and not by
reason of any representation made to Buyer by Seller
or the Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its
condition, size, location, present value, future value,
income herefrom or as to its production. Buyer accepts
the property in "as is" condition subject to Seller's
warranties as outlined in Section 6. In the event Buyer
desires any additional inspection, said inspection
shall be allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by
Buyer.
(2) C. SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that:
(a) Seller has received no claim nor notice of any
building or zoning violation concerning the property
which has not or will not be remedied prior to closing;
(b) all obligations against the property including
taxes, assessments, mortgages, liens, or other
encumbrances of any nature shall be brought current on
or before closing; and (c) the plumbing, heating, air
conditioning, and ventilating systems, electrical
systems, and appliances shall be sound or in
satisfactory working condition at closing.
(3) L. COMPLETE AGREEMENT-NO ORAL AGREEMENTS.
This
instrument constitutes the entire agreement
between the parties and supercedes and cancels any and
all prior negotiations, representations, warranties,
understandings, or agreements between the parties.
There are no oral agreements which modify or affect
this agreement. This Agreement cannot be changed except
by mutual written agreement of the parties.
(4) N. DEFAULT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES
. . . Both parties agree that should either party default in
any of the covenants or agreements herein contained, the
defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses,
including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or
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accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement or in
pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by applicable law,
whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise.

3.

Plaintiffs do not claim and there is no evidence that there

were any subsequent mutual written agreements between Plaintiffs
and Jarvik or Plaintiffs and Eagar.

4.

Plaintiff

Robert

D.

Maack

is

an

attorney

licensed

to

practice law in the State of Utah, and has practiced law in the
State of Utah for many years.

5.

Plaintiffs

claim

that

prior

to

the

execution

of

the

Agreement, Plaintiffs were informed by Maclyn Kesselring of Eagar
that there was a "builder's warranty" covering the Home, and that
based upon that representation, Plaintiffs did not have a general
contractor inspect the Home on their behalf.

6.

The

Agreement

does

not

condition

Plaintiffs1

offer

to

purchase the Home upon the performance an inspection or on an
acceptable inspection report.

7.

Plaintiffs

did

not

ask

for

a

copy

does

not

condition

of

the

"builder's

warranty".

8.

The

Agreement

Plaintiffs'

offer

to

purchase the Home upon the existence of a "builder's warranty".
4
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9.

Following purchase of the Home, the plaintiffs made demands

upon the defendant's contractor to correct alleged defects in the
Home and sued the defendant

for Breach of Contract and

other

claims, stating that they relied upon oral representations made
by the realtor that there was a one-year builders' warranty and
that "remedial repair work ... should have been covered by a oneyear builder's warranty." (First Amended Complaint paragraphs 612)

10.

BASED UPON the above facts, the Court concludes as follows:
(a). The Agreement is clear and unambiguous.
(b). The Agreement is properly executed.
(c) . The

court

finds

absolutely

no

misrepresentation

or

fraud.
(d) . Plaintiffs' failure to ask for a copy of the alleged
"builder's

warranty"

and

failure

to

obtain

an

inspection

constituted conduct below the level of ordinary diligence.
(e). Plaintiffs' failure to ask for a copy of the "builder's
warranty" and failure to condition their offer to purchase the
Home on the existence of a "builder's warranty" indicate that
Plaintiffs did not treat the representation as material and did
not rely upon the representation when they purchased the Home.
(f) . The integration clause of the Agreement at Paragraph L
of the General Provisions entitled "COMPLETE AGREEMENT- NO ORAL
AGREEMENTS", is clear and unambiguous, and precludes any claims
5
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Plaintiffs may have with regard to all oral agreements and all
prior negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings
or agreements not expressly stated in the Agreement, whether made
by Jarvik or Eagar.
(g). One

of

the

covenants

of

the

Earnest

Money

Sales

Agreement was to honor Paragraph L. Attempts by the plaintiffs to
enforce an alleged "builder's warranty" based on Eagarfs oral
representations made prior to closing constitute a default of
that covenant.
(h). Dr. Jarvik and Eagar are exculpated based on the total
written agreement.

11.

Based upon the foregoing, the Court hereby grants Jarvik1s

Motion

for Summary Judgement on each of the claims asserted

against him by the Plaintiffs.

DATED this 11th day of May, 1992.

6
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument was mailed, first class, postage prepaid on
this 11th day of May, 1992, to the following:
Mark A. Larsen
Campbell, Maack & Sessions
One Utah Center — 1300
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
K.M. Frankenburg, Esq.
Williams & Hunt
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
PO Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
Michael F. Heyrend # 1480
310 "E" Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84103
Paul D. Newman
Snell & Wilmer
60 East South Temple, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

VHPU^*^
Robert Jarvik, M.D.
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GARY B. FERGUSON (A1062)
KURT M. FRANKENBURG (A5279)
WILLIAMS & HUNT
Attorneys for Defendants
and Third-Party Plaintiffs
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
Post Office Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
Telephone: (801) 521-5678

FRED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

JUN 1 7 1992
A

, S^LT U « t t COUNTY

T

2MJJ
Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT D. MAACK and JUDITH
MAACK,
Plaintiffs,

RULE 52 STATEMENT OF GROUNDS
AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AGAINST PLAINTIFFS

vs.
RESOURCE DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION,
INC., a Utah corporation, and
TIMOTHY HOAGLAND, an
individual,
Defendants.

Civil No. 900903201CV
Hon. Pat B. Brian

RESOURCE DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION,
INC., a Utah corporation,
and TIMOTHY HOAGLAND, an
individual.
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs,
ROBERT JARVIK, M.D.
Third-Party Defendant.

The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Resource
Design & Construction, Inc. and Timothy Hoagland on or about
March 25, 1992, came on for hearing before the Court, pursuant to
notice, on May 6 and 7, 1992.

Plaintiff Robert D. Maack was
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present representing himself and being represented by counsel,
Mark A. Larsen.

Plaintiff Judith D. Maack was represented by

counsel, Michael F. Heyrend and Robert D. Maack.

Defendant

Resource Design & Construction, Inc. ("Resource Design") and
Timothy Hoagland were represented by counsel, Kurt M. Frankenburg
of Williams & Hunt.

Defendant Jarvik appeared pro se and

participated telephonically in the hearings.

Third-Party

Defendant Eagar & Company was represented by counsel, Paul D.
Newman of Snell & Wilmer.

The Court, having reviewed the

motions, memoranda and supporting materials filed by the parties,
having considered the arguments presented at the hearing, and
good cause appearing, bases its decision on the following
grounds:
There is no genuine dispute with respect to the following
material facts:
1.

Defendant Resource Design & Construction, Inc.

("Resource Design") has been a Utah corporation in good standing
since approximately 1979. Resource Design is in the business of
construction contracting, primarily in the areas of custom
residential homes and light commercial buildings.
2.

Plaintiff Robert D. Maack is an attorney licensed to

practice law in the State of Utah, and has practiced law in the
State of Utah for many years.
3.

In early 1986 Dr. Robert Jarvik (defendant and third-

party defendant) approached Resource Design to request that it

2
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build him a personal residence at 432 6 White Way in Salt Lake
City.
4.
designer.

Dr. Jarvik subsequently contacted a professional house
Dr. Jarvik presented his own drawings of the house he

wanted to build to the house designer who then assisted Jarvik in
preparing the plans.
5.

On or about July 1, 1986, Resource Design entered a

standard form agreement between owner and contractor with Dr.
Jarvik to construct a home for Jarvik.
6.

Resource Design completed construction of Jarvik7s home

one year later, in early July, 1987. Dr. Jarvik was very
satisfied with the work done by Resource Design and made final
payment and acceptance under the construction contract.
7.

Due to a job change, Dr. Jarvik moved from Salt Lake

City to New York City in the summer of 1987. He consequently
listed the completed home for sale.
8.

Dr. Jarvik arranged to have someone live in the home

through the winter of 1987-1988 and subsequently rented the home
for a short period of time in the summer of 1988.
9.

On July 26, 1988 plaintiffs Robert and Judith Maack

contacted the listing agent on Jarvik's home and, after looking
at the house, entered into a Earnest Money Sales Agreement for
the full asking price.

The Earnest Money Sales Agreement

specified that plaintiffs were purchasing the home "as is"
without any warranties as to its condition.

3
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10.

On July 27, 1988, Robert Jarvik signed and accepted the

Earnest Money Sales Agreement.
11.

Prior to purchasing the home, plaintiffs did not have a

general contractor, professional inspector, or anyone else
inspect the Home on their behalf.
12.

Although Plaintiffs claim they were informed by Maclyn

Kesselring of Eagar that there was a "builder's warranty"
covering the Home, plaintiffs did not ask for any written
evidence of the "builder's warranty" nor did they include any
reference to a builder's warranty in the Earnest Money Sales
Agreement.
13.

After plaintiffs executed the Earnest Money Sales

Agreement they first learned that the house had been built by
Resource Design & Construction, Inc.
14.

Plaintiffs' first contact with Resource Design or Tim

Hoagland came on or about August 30, 1988, when Mr. Hoagland sent
plaintiffs a letter on the stationery of "Resource Design &
Construction, Inc."
15.

After closing on the house and moving in, plaintiffs

asked Resource Design to perform certain work on their home.
After Resource Design performed substantial work on plaintiffs'
home, plaintiffs refused to pay for the work done.
16.

Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint alleges claims for

negligence, strict liability, res

ipsa

loquitur,

and

misrepresentation against defendants Resource Design and
Hoagland.
4

or^n

17.

Plaintiffs do not claim that a contract ever existed

between them and defendants Resource Design or Timothy Hoagland.
BASED UPON the above undisputed facts, the Court concludes
as follows:
1.
product.

Defendants were not sellers or manufacturers of a
Therefore, there is no basis for plaintiffs' strict

liability claim.
2.

Plaintiffs failed to establish any facts indicating

that defendants made any material misrepresentations of fact or
otherwise.

Therefore, there is no basis for plaintiffs'

negligent and/or intentional misrepresentation claim.
3.

Plaintiffs failed to establish any facts indicating

detrimental reliance by them upon alleged representations by
defendants.

Therefore, there is no basis for plaintiffs'

negligent and/or intentional misrepresentation claim.
4.

Because there is no basis for plaintiffs' intentional

misrepresentation claim, there can be and is no basis for
plaintiffs' punitive damage claim.
5.

Defendants have no duty to plaintiffs which could make

them liable for loss of use and enjoyment or costs of repair or
replacement of plaintiffs' property.

Therefore, there is no

basis for plaintiffs' negligence and res ipsa loquitur claims.
5.

Plaintiffs' failure to ask for a copy or written

evidence of a "builder's warranty", their failure to condition
their offer to purchase the Home on the existence of a "builder's
warranty" or on the receipt of an acceptable inspection report,
5

002

especially in light of Robert Maack's professional training,
clearly shows, and a reasonable jury could not find otherwise,
that plaintiffs did not exercise ordinary, reasonable diligence.
BASED UPON the foregoing, the Court hereby grants the Motion
for Summary Judgment filed by Resource Design & Construction,
Inc. and Defendant Timothy Hoagland on each and every claim
asserted against them by plaintiffs.
DATED this

J 7

day of

\X //^?^^
,IWTHTC

*

, 1992.

eoirarn

/ r

^"

c

^ ,

HONORABLE
PAT B.
BRTATT
District Court
Judge

W$t\
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH
ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Mary C. Wardell, being duly sworn, says that she is employed
in the law offices of Williams & Hunt, attorneys for defendants
and third-party plaintiffs Resource Design & Construction, Inc.
and Timothy Hoagland herein; that she served the attached RULE 52
STATEMENT OF GROUNDS AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST PLAINTIFFS in Case No. 900903201CV
before the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, upon the parties listed below by placing a true
and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Robert K. Jarvik, M.D. (Via First Class Mail)
124 West 60th Street
New York, New York 10023
Robert D. Maack (Via Hand Delivery)
Mark A. Larsen
CAMPBELL, MAACK & SESSIONS
One Utah Center, 13th Floor
2 01 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Paul D. Newman, Esq. (Via Hand Delivery)
SNELL & WILMER
60 E. South Temple, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Michael R. Heyrend, Esq. (Via Hand Delivery)
310 E Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid,
or personally hand-delivered, as indicated above, on the
day of May, 1992.

,o X

V

*)

Mary C. Wardell
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

dJ-

day of May,

1992
Notary Public ^
•
SHARONo M ALLHANDS 1
-rt7 c - - t " ~ ^ Suite 500 I

^

-h 84145 J

minfitt

Residing in Salt Lak
County, State of Utah
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THE CONTRACT
1.1

DOCUMENTS

The Contract Documents consist of this Agreement, the Conditions of the Contract (General, Supplementary
and other Conditions), the Drawings, the Specifications, all Addenda issued prior to and all Modifications
issued after execution of this Agreement. These form the Contract, and all are as fully a part of the Contract
as if attached to this Agreement or repeated herein. An enumeration of the Contract Documents appears in
Article 16. If anything in the Contract Documents is inconsistent with this Agreement, the Agreement shall
govern.
ARTICLE 2
THE W O R K

2,1

The Contractor shall perform all the Work required by the Contract: Documents for
(Here insert

the caption

descriptive

nf the Work

.;« iitccJ1 on it her Cunt net

Documents.)

PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS PREPARED BI ROBERT J ARVIK (OWNER) ill I)
TODD ANDERSON (DESIGNER) FOR JARVIK RESIDENCE SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

A RTI CLE 2
Tl IE C O N I RAC I OR S DUTIES A N D S I A • • >
3.1

The Contractor accepts the relationship of trust and confidence established betw,
- a,, u u,c
this Agreement. He covenants with the Owner to furnish his best skill and judgment and to coopei ate \ vith*
the Architect in furthering the interests of the Owner. He agrees to furnish efficient business administration and superintendence and to use his best efforts to furnish at all times an adequate supply of workmen
and materials, and to perform the Work in the best way and in the most expeditious and economical manner
consistent with the interests of the Owner.

TIME O r v. • ' -\^
4.1

Tl me V oi I : to be p e r f o

t

t 'N < Af\L>

MjLi^

rmoH

and, subject to authorized adjustments;
Substantial Completion shall be achieved not i j i c iiun
(Here insert any sped*! provisions lor liquidated

.fjr-j'ci

/E3.

. .

FINISHED DEFINED AS COMPLETE AND OCCUFIABLE
ONLY EXCEPTIONS
E] : TERIOR WORK WHICH .MUST REMAIN TO THE FOLLOWING SPRING DUE
TO WEATHER.
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Uo»

Kjr iriE WORK A I ^ K.

5.1

!
The Owner agrees to reimburse the Contractor for b.c ^:>i
reimbursement shall be in addition, to the Contractor's Fee stipub;-: i r

5.2

The maximum cost to the Owner, including the Cost: of the Work and the Contractor's Fee, is guaranteed not
to exceed the sum of
dollars
($
); such Guaranteed Maximum Cost shall be increased or decreased for Changes In
the Work as provided in Article 7.
(Here insert any provision lor distribution o/

i

,

• »

c...— ... Article 8. Such

" t J ii'h 5 2 tt there is no Lu*r*nteed Maximum Cost)

NO GUARANTEED MAXIMUM
TARGET FIGURE FOR ALL COSTS EXCLUSIVE OF COBPPRAnT^-S FKF TH $17 r i,

I

I

ARTICLE 6
CONTRACTOR'S FEE
6,1

In consideration of the performance of the Contract, the Owner agrees to pay the Conlractor in current funds
as compensation for his services a Contractor's Fee as follow < fs:

FEE OF $28,000.00 I" r 'MPLETEP WI'T'!'1 " b MONTHS
.i $27,000.00 "
"
7 MONTHS
$25,000.00 "
"
3 MONTHS
ff
$23,000.00
"
9 MONTHS
$20,000.00 ff
"
*
j.0 MONTHS

6.2

Ft

'
" |,

'
"

,

i, J,i i" •, I LI !,:" 1.11,a 11 Ij e adJ u s I c d ai Io 111• w s :

NONE

i ne Contractor shall be paid
percent {
%) of the proportional amount
of his Fee with each progress payment, and the balance of his Fee shall be paid at the time of final payment.
$2,500.00

PER MONTH FOR 8 MONTHS AND REMAINDER UPON COMPLETION BEGINNING JULY 1
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7.1

The Owner may make Changes in tre Work a, provu>-i
. .
act Documents. The Contractor shall be
reimbursed for Changes In the Wi > or trie basis or Cost or the Work as defined in Article 8

7.2

The Contractor's Fee for Changes in the Work shall be as set forth in Paragraph 6.2, or in the absence of specific provisions therein, shall be adjusted by negotiation on the basis of the Fee established for the original
Work,
ARTICLE 8
COSTS TO BE REIMBURSED
Fhe term Cost of the Work shall mean costs necessarily incurred in the proper performance of the Work and
paid by the Contractor. Such costs shall be at rates not higher than the standard paid in the locality of the
Work except with prior consent of the Owner, and shall include the items set forth below in this Article 8.

811

Wages paid for labor in the direct employ of the Contractor in the performance of the Work under applicable
collective bargaining agreements, or under a salary or wage schedule agreed upon by the Owner and Contract s and including such welfare or other benefits, if any, as may be payable with respect thereto.

812

Salaries of Contractor's personnel when stationed at the field office, in whatever capacity employed. Personnel
engaged, at shops or on the road, in expediting the production or transportation of materials or equipment,
shall be considered as stationed at the field office and their salaries paid for that portion of their time spent
on this Work,

8 I3

Cost of contributions, assessments or taxes incurred during the performance of the Work for such items as
unemployment compensation and social security, insofar as such cost is based on wages, salaries, or other
remuneration paid to employees of the Contractor and included in the Cost of the Work under Subparagraphs
8.1.1 and 8.1.2.
. o portion of reasonable travel and subsistence expenses o.
~~ — * . -. ^. . •-. -,..n.<..> <; :
-red while traveling in discharge of duties connected ^ * *^e W o r k r c n o e x c e p t "by STDec
-OSt of all materials,, supplies and equipment incorpora^
hereof.

* > >* , -

-c r,n

:,ts

roval

rs

-> :-j"i^or;ai:or.

Payments made by the Contractor to Subcontractors tot Work perrorme I
Agreement.
-lost, including transportation and maintenance, of all materials, supplies, equipment, temporary facilities and
nand tools not owned by the workers, which are consumed in the performance of the Work, and cost less
salvage value on such items used but not consumed which remain the property of the Contractor,
Rental charges of all necessary machinery and equipment, exclusive of hand tools, used at: the site of the
Work, whether rented from the Contractor or others, including installation, minor repairs and replacements,
dismantling, removal, transportation and delivery costs thereof, at rental charges consistent with those pi evailing in the area.
ost of premiums fo- aK l> ."jrchase and •
Sales, use or similar taxes re.-i:et. mental authority.

•

nruments
»VD'K J -J

, *.. *

• ? -m 11 fees, roya 11ies, damages ior ii \ ir\ ngemen t of pa ten ts and
' ii" causes other than the Contractor's negligence.

- wOntr^cu

.ab'o ir-;,nscc: t\ arv govern-

•'. I • ill 11 ini I i II 11

' i ill1', III

I

i II < I e p o * i i ms

mosses and expenses, not compensated by insurance or otherwise, sustained by the Contractor in connection
with the Work, provided they have resulted from causes other than the fault or neglect of the Contractor.
Such losses shall include settlements made with the written consent and approval of the Owner. No such
losses and expenses shall be included in the Cost of the Work for the purpose of determining the Contractor's Fee. If, however, such,,,loss requires reconstruction and the Contractor is placed in charge thereof,, he
shall be paid for his services a fee proportionate to that stated in Paragraph 6.1.
8. 1.13

Minor expenses such as telegrams, loa& rihra nee telephone caiU^toUphone settee e» ri^tfe, expressage, and
similar petty cash items in connection with the Work.

8 1,14

Cost of removal of all debris.
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8.1.15

Costs incurred due to ai i emergency affecting the safety of persons and property.

8.1.16

Other costs incurred in the performance of the Work: if and to the extent: approved in advance in writing by
the Owner. NONE
pment rental charc.es and small tool charges applicable

(Here insert modifications or
to the Work J

COSTS

'it K t i -

r h e term Cost of the Work shall n o t inciuue any <.;; the items a «. i<; " ut
9.1.1

*

-

ti

\

f

;

^

Salaries or other compensation of the Contractor's personnel at the Contractors *
offices,

o t h e r t h a n an . a c c o u n t i n g c l e r k , n o t t o e x c e e d

*

$500.

9 1.2

Expenses of the Contractor's principal and branch offices other than the field office.

9 13

Any part of the Contractor's capital expenses, including interest: on the Contractor's capital emploved fa *S
Work.
Except as specifically provided for in 5ubparagi ap 1 i 8.1 8 o ii i ic difi :atitc is 11 ei et: :>, i ei itaI c: ::: s
and equipment
Overhead or general expenses of any kind except: as .may be expressly included in Ai tide 8.

9 1.4
9,1,5
916

Costs due to the negligence of the Contractor, any Subcontractor, anyone directly or indirectly employed by
any of them, or for whose acts any of them may be liable, including but not limited to the correction of
defective or nonconforming Work, disposal of materials and equipment wrongly supplied, or making good
any damage to property.

9 17

The cost of any item not specifically ai id

9.1.8

Costs in excess of the Guaranteed Maximum Cost, if any, as set forth in Article 5 and .adjusted | :: in si itai t !:• ::)
Article 7,

;cu ... Ai tide 8.

FUEL FOR VEHICLES

U\
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ARTICLE 10'
DISCOUNT'S,, REBATES AMD' REFUNDS
10,1

All cash discounts shall accrue to the Contractor unless the Owner deposits funds with the Contractor with
which to make payments, in which case the cash discounts shall accrue to the Owner. All trade discounts,
rebates and refunds, and all returns from sale of surplus materials and equipment shall accrue to the Ow Tier,
and the Contractor shall make provisions so that they can be secured.
(Here insert any provisions relating to deposits by the Owner to permit the Contractor to obtain cash discounts.)

h l \ U V . LL

l i

SUBCONTRACTS A N D OTHER AGREEMENTS
ii.*

All portions of the Work that the Contractor's organization does not perform; shall be performed under Subcontracts or by other appropriate agreement with the Contractor. The Contractor shall request bids from Subcontractors and shall deliver such bids to the Architect. The Owner will then determine, with the advice.of the
Contractor and subject to the reasonable objection of the Architect which bids will be accepted.arcSi^ecf
All Subcontracts shall conform to the requirements of the Contract Documents. Subcontracts awarded on the
basis of the cost of such work plus a fee shall also be subject to the provisions of this Agreement insofar as
applicable.
4K l i l l t ; 12
ACCOUNTING

12.1

RECORDS

The Contractor shall check ail materials, equipment and labor entering into the Work and shall keep such full
and detailed accounts as may be necessary for proper financial management under this Agreement, and the
system shall be satisfactory to the Owner. The Owner shall be afforded access to all the Contractor's records,
books, correspondence, instructions, drawings, receipts, vouchers, memoranda and similar data relating to this
Contract, and the Contractor shall preserve all such records for a period of three years, or for si ich longer
period as may be required by law, after the final payment.
ARTICLE 13

APPLICATIONS FOR PAYll IE! I I
13.1

The Contractor shall, at least ten days before each payment falls due, deliver to the Architect an itemized
statement, notarized if required, showing in complete detail all moneys paid out or costs incurred by him on
account of the Cost of the Work during the previous month for which he is to be reimbursed under Article 5
and the amount of the Contractor's Fee due as provided in Article 6, together with payrolls for all labor and
such other data supporting the Contractor's right to payment for Subcontracts or materials as the Owner or
the Architect may require
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ARTICLE 14
I! " a I \ LEI i TS 1" O THE CONTRACTOR
14 1

The Architect will review the Contractor's Applications for Payment and will promptly take appropriate action
thereon as provided in the Contract Documents. Such amount as he may recommend for payment shall be
payable by the Owner not later than the
10th
day of the month.

III I

li i taking action on the Contractor's Applications for Payment, the Architect shall be entitled to rely on the
accuracy and completeness of the information furnished by the Contractor and shall not be deemed to represent that he has made audits of the supporting data, exhaustive or continuous on-site inspections or that he
has made any examination to ascertain how or for what purposes the Contractor has used the moneys previously paid on account of the Contract.

1 12

Final payment, constituting the entire unpaid balance of the Cost: of tl le Work and of the Contract,
shall be paid by the Owner to the Contractor
IQ
lys after Substantial Compie
f
the Work unless otherwise stipulated in the Certificate of Substai itial C :::)! pletion, provided the Work ha- * i
completed, the Contract: fully performed, and final payment has I:: sei i i ecoi nmended by the Architect.

14,3

Payments due and unpaid under the Contract Documents shall bear intei est from the date payment: is due at
the rate entered below, or in the absence thereof, at the legal rate prevailii ig at the place of the Project
(Here insert any rate ol interest agreed

upon.)

AT EITHER 10JS OR THE RATE ACTUALLY CHARGED TO THE CONTRACTOR

(Usury laws and requirements under the federal Truth in Lending Act. similar state and local consumer credit laws and other regulations at the
Owner's and Contractor's principal places ol business, the location ol the Pro/cci and elsewhere may afiect the validity ol this provision. Specific
Icfial advice should he nhtained with retprct to deletion, modification, or other requirements such as written disclosures or waivers.)

... ,

Jhe Conti act i i lay be terminated by the Contractor a-> provided in the uonti act Documents

15.2

if the Owner terminates the Contract as provided in the Contract Documents, he shall reimburse the Contractor for any unpaid Cost of the Work due him under Article 5, plus (1) the unpaid balance of the Fee computed upon the Cost of the Work to the date of termination at the rate of the percentage named in Article 6,
or (2) if the Contractor's Fee be stated as a fixed sum, such an amount as will increase the payments on
account of his Fee to a sum which bears the same ratio to the said fixed sum as the Cost of the Work at the
time of termination bears to the adjusted Guaranteed Maximum Cost, if any, otherwise to a reasonable estimated Cost of the Work when completed. The Owner shall also pay to the Contractor fair compensation,
either by purchase or rental at the election of the Owner, for any equipment retained. In case of such termination of the Contract the Owner shall further assume and become liable for obligations, commitments and
unsettled claims that the Contractor has previously undertaken or incurred in good faith in connection with
said Work. The Contractor shall, as a condition of receiving the payments referred to in this Article 15, execute
and deliver alt such papers and take all such steps, including the legal assignment of his contractual rights, as
the Owner may require for the purpose of fully vesting in himself the rights and benefits of the Contractor
under such obligations or commitments.
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\RNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT
Legend

Yes (X)

No (O)

This la a legally binding c o n t r a c t Read the entire document carefully before signing.

3

REALTOR

GENERAL PROVISIONS
•»*MtWMtT

(Sections)

I N C L U D E D I T E M S . Unless excluded herein, this sale shall Include all fixtures and any of the following Items If presently attached to the property, plumbing, heating,
jonditioning and ventilating fixtures and equipment, water heater, built-in appliances, light fixtures and bulbs, bathroom fixtures, curtalna and draperiea and rods, winw and door screens/storm doors, window blinds, awnings. Installed television antenna, walRo-waJI carpets, water softener, automatic garage door opener and tranamit"<s)( fencing .'trees and shrubs.
3, I N S P E C T I O N . Unless otherwise indicated, Buyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said property upon Buyer's own examination and Judgment and not by reason
any representation made to Buyer by Seller or the Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its condition, size, location, present value, future value. Income herefrom or as
is production. Buyer accepts the property In "as is" condition subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in Section 6. in the event Buyer desires any additional Inspection.
inspection snaJI.be allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by Buyer.
S E I X ^ WARRANTIES'. Seller warrants t h a t (a) Seller has received no claim nor notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property which has not
will not' bVremedie5'prior to closing; (b) all obligations against the property including taxes, assessments, mortgages, liens or other encumbrances of any nature shall
brought currenTonf or before closing; and (c) the plumbing, heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical system, and appliances shall be sound or in
isfacton/working condition at closing.
C O N D I T I O ^ OEjWELJ*. f e l l e r warrants 'that any private well serving the property has, to the best of Seller's knowledge, provided an adquate supply of water and
itinued use of .the well or wells is authorized by a state permit or other legal water right.
C O N D I T I O N OP S E P T I C T A N K . Seller warrants that any septic tank serving the property is, to the best of Seller's I :. • : mi 1 a jge i i g : : ::( < o. king oi don an :1 Seller
no knowledge of any needed repairs and it meets ail applicable government health and construction standards.
ACCELERATION C L A U S E . Not less than five (5) days prior to closing. Seller shall provide to Buyer written verification as to whether or not any notes, mortgages,
s of trust or real estate contracts against the property require the consent of the holder of such Instruments) to the sale of the property or permit the holder to raise
interest rate and/or declare the entire balance due in the event of aale. If any such document so provides and holder does not waive the same or unconditionally
~ove the sale, Buyer shall have the option to declare this Agreement null and void by giving written notice to Seller or Seller's agent prior to dosing. In such case,
earnest money received under this Agreement shall be returned to Buyer. It Is understood and agreed that If provisions for said "Due on Sale** clause are set forth
; action 7 herein,' alternatives allowed herein shall become null and void,
[l
t I I E I N S P E C T I O N . Not less than five (5) days prior to closing, Seller shall provide to Buyer either en abstract of title brought current with a n attorney's opinion
preliminary title report on the subject property. Prior to closing. Buyer shall give written notice to Seller or Seller's agent, specifying reasonable objections to title.
eafter, Seller shall be required, through escrow at closing, to cure the defect(s) to which Buyer has objected. If said defects) Is not curable through an escrow agreeif dosing, this Agreement shall be null and void at the option of the Buyer, and all monies received herewith shall b e returned to the respective parties.

FITLE I N S U R A N C E . If title Insurance is elected. Seller authorizes the Listing Brokerage to order a preliminary commitment for a policy of title Insurance to be issued
- h title insurance company as Seller shall designate. Title policy to be issued shall contain no exceptions other than those provided for in said standard form, a n d
sumbrances or defects excepted under the final contract of sale. If title cannot be made so insurable through an escrow agreement at closing, the earnest money
unless Buyer elects to waive such defects or encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and this Agreement shall thereupon be terminated. Seller agrees to pay any
nation charge.
IXISTINQ T E N A N T L E A S E S . 11 Buyer is to take title subject to an existing lease or leases. Seller agrees to provide to Buyer not less than five (5) days prior to closing
?y of all existing leases (and any amendments thereto) affecting the property. Unless reasonable written objection Is given by Buyer to Seller or Seller's agent prior
:r
»Q. Buyer shall take title aubject to such leases. If the objection(s) is not remedied ai or prior to closing, this Agreement shall be null and void.
CHANGES DURING T R A N S A C T I O N , During the pendency of this Agreement, Seller agrees that no changes In any existing leases shall be macl
ad Into, nor shall any aubstantiaJ alterations or Improvements-be made or undertaken without the written consent of the Buyer,
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r MONEY SALES AQHLL W L N 1

No(0)

EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT

1 ,
DA1F
The undersigned Buyer _ j T ' / £ - & £ < * /
/ ^ K ///£&(L/LS
as EARNEST MONEY. t h e ^ L . , n , of / £ * > J r V ^ l ^ ^ /

-—-^
/ d S ^ X <*<^//4*p
—

i the form nf
hicb shall be deposited in accordance with applicable State Law
iroke/age

\MM-^ *^

— — —

T

_

,
<^p2f

f*hone Number

,f f
hereby deposits withBrokerage
Dollars ($ / r f A ^ . = * !
.)

.

s

/

\

JJ

————.
y

7

/

/

//

OFFER TO PilffClWiE
}{ m?~i[

1JPROPERJY' DESCRIPTION The above stated EARNEST MONBY is grvento^secure and ap^fy 0 n the purchase of the* property situated a

Wf&/Zj
tisAfJy
In the City of
*XAJLIJ
_ _ county of _ y/k^/" ^ L ^ ^
.
Utah
y/rfjf
ubject to any restrictive Covenants, zoning regulations, utility M other easements or nghts of way, government patents or state deeds of record approved by Buyer in
iccordance with SectioruG. Said property is owned by
^Cf£^^/
\IYAJ%£S£*S
^ _ a s sellers, and ismore particularly described
J

CHECK APPLICABLE mX$&T&*^
D UNIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY

D VacanlLot

D Vacai^Acreage

**^LcJ~^&Z£^
D Other _ £
7

"

*

I jS" IMPROVED REAL PROPERTY
• Commercial
Ef Residential
• Condo
C3 Other .
(a) Included Items.. Unless excluded below, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the items shown in Section A if presently attached to the property.
The followinggersonaj property shall also be included in this sale and conyeye4 under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to titi«- ML/Z
faj^jL*Mt
(b) Excluded Items. The following items are specifically excluded from this sale:.^ f e 2 ^ C ^

._. „ „ _

(c) CONNECTIONS, UTILITIES AND OTHER RIGHTS Seller represents that the property includes the following improvements in the purchase price
SJ public sewer QJ connected
0 well
O connected
D other
Jg electricity
(2f connected
Z3 septic tank
Z2 connected
Z?other sanitary system _
0

public water

B private water
^

27 irrigation water / secondary system
* of shares
Company _

„ _

J2t connected

D TV antenna

Q connected

£3 natural gas

S u r w v # A certl f, ed $ U P v 6 y

Qs n a U

be

Q ingress & egress by private easement
fgj dedicated road 0 paved

D master antenna Q prewired
0 connected

0 curb and gutter
Q other nghts

f u r n i $ h e C | a t the expense of

_

pnor to closing, J2 shall not be foinisi ut

(e) Buyer Inspection. Buyer has made a visual inspection of the property and subject to Section 1 (c) above and 6 below, accepts it in its present physical
condition, except: ~^*&~TL^C^

1

mmmm

_.__„„.__»«_«_»_-^^

PURCHASE PRICE AND FINANCING. The total Djurchase price tor the property « ^

_

O

; /H^^^LC^

•7 - f W < ^ ^ , ^ (
y*^>//e^>
Dollars i% ^f*?j^
/> #«#4> iJ& which represents the aforedescnbed EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT:
Z£>0j 6-0Ot ^ representing the approximate balance of CASH DOWN PAYMENT at closing.
•

^^

^V^fzrxr J

/PylLjXUi-

&&0 .&?

_

rUA-*&/
^ h i A ^ i h / p ^ ^ f n . ^

representing the approximate balance of an existing mortgage, trust deed note., real estate contract or other encumbrance to be assumed b* buys
which obligation bears interest at
% per annum with monthly bayments of $ _ _ _ « _ _ _ _ ^ _
_ . _
which Include:
D principal;
D interest;
D taxes; D insurance;
Q condo fees;
Q other

p

representing the approximate balance of an additional existing mortgage, trust deed note real estate contract or other encumbrances to be
assumeq by Buyer, which obligation bears interest at _ —
% per annum with monthly payments of $ _ _ _ _ _ _
_
which include.
• principal,
• interest
Q taxes. • insurance;
D condo fees;
• other.

~±.,4yZJ£*L*~£* representing balance, if any, including(proceeds from a new mortgage loan, nr nollor fimnnng, trj ho paid Q3 failure

Other

'KtoP

TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE

II jy i is (equ.red to assume an underlying obligjUon (in which case Section F shall also apply) md/or obtain outside financing. Buyer agrees to use best illoits
>ume indior procure sam^ a n d this offer Is made subject to Buyer qualifying for and lending institution granting said assumption and/or financing Buyer agrees
iake application within
/ ^ — days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreementtoas,sume the underlying oblioation and/or obtain the new financing at
merest rate not to exceed _
%. if Buyer does not qualify for the assumption and/orfinancingwithin /Jjjf ttTSKJut**^
l f t er Seller's acceptance
in Agreement, this Agreement shall be voidable at the option of the Seller upon written notice. Seller agrees to pay up to
"

nnl l0 #XC#ed $

—

•

{n l d d , t k > n

- »•«•' mrms to pay $ . _ ^ m . . .

mortgage loan discount

to be used for Buyer's other loan costs.

A n

SL\
i

I . four page form

Seller'. I n l t l a M ^ U (

^ - -As

001541
)

Date

Uu

p i . i.iiliii, |

|,

)

D

j

9

QQ( ) 1 Q 9

3. CONDITION AND CONVi
ACE OF TITLE. Seller represents that Seller f£holds title to the property in fee sir.
D is purchasing the property under a res
estate contract. Transfer of Seller's ownership interest shall be made as set forth in Section S. Seller agrees to furnish good and marketable title to the property, subjec
to encumbrances and exceptions noted herein, evidenced by pi a, current policy of Utte insurance in the amount of purchase price Q an abstract of title brought curren
with an attorney s opinion (See Section H).
4. INSPECTION OF TITLE. In accordance with Section G. Buyer than have the opportunity lo iruroect the tWetothe subject property priortodosing. Buyer shall take tit
subject to any existing restrictive covenants, incfudirig corictomiraum
restriction
(CC
i restrictions
(CC
A R's). Buyer U h a s Q has not renewed anycaictomiruumCXAI^pn^tosjpningthia^
5. VESTING OF TITLE. Title shall vest in Buyer as follows:.
6. SELLERS WARRANTIES. In addition to warranties contained in Section C. the following items are also warranted:.
Exceptions to the above and Section C snail be limited to the following:,
7. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES. This offer is made subject to the following special conditions ancVor contingencies which must be satisfies
S ? ^ J s77L*C^
iCtS
Jl&Lt^ZL<C
^ ^
/ ^ ^ ZUS/UULA
;
pnor<r to Heemy ***£&Jas

. at a reasonable location to be designated b>
19.
8. CLOSING OF SALE. This Agreement shall be dosed on or before .
Seller, subject to Section Q. Upon demand. Buyer shall deposit with the escrow dosing office all documents necessary to complete the purchase In accordance wrtt
this Agreement Prorations set forth in Section R shall be made as of D date of possession D date ofeiosing D other
%
9. POSSESSION. Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer « « ^ / ^ /4ff~^j£J*f*&££*
extended by written agreement ofparties,
10. AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At the sionjpg of this Agreement the listing agent
/ f t £ ^ y ^
^ O t ^ ^ y
represents JXj Seller ( ) Buyer,
and the selling agent r J*ifyf^fr*t^i^^''&L4^^
represents f X Seller ( fBuyer Buyer and Seller confirm that prior to signing this Agreement
written disclosure of the agenc^re|ettion/hip(s) was provided to him/her. (
11. GENERAL PROVISIONS.
ACCEPTED BY *
ENT"

)(

) Buyer's initials \

) t J 3 r ) Seder's Initials.

IS OTHERWISE INDICATED ABOVE. THE GENERAL PROVISION SECTIONS ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF HAVE BEEN
SELLER AND ARE INCORPORATED INTO THIS AGREEMENT BY REFERENCE.

?HASE AND TIME LIMIT FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions. Seller shall
to accept this offer. Unless accepted, this offer shall lapse and the Agent shall return the EARNEST

T
(Buyer's Signatu
(Buyer's Signature)

(Date)

(Address)
(Address) (

fPhone)
(Phone)

(SSWTAX ID)

(Address)

(Phone)

(SSN/TAX ID)

CHECK ONE
—
_
D ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above.
•
REJECTION. Seller hereby REJECTS the foregoing offer
(Seller's initials)
D COUNTER OFFER. Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer SUBJECT TO the exceptions or modifications as specified below or in the attached Addendum, and
presents said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer's acceptance. Buyer shall have until
(AM/PM)
, 19
to accept the terms
specified below.

Seller's Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

(Address)

(Phone)

(SSN/TAX ID)

(Date)

(Time)

(Address)

(Phone)

(SSN/TAX ID)

:HECK ONE:
OFFER. Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER
EJECTS the COUNTER OFFER.
(Buyer's Initials)

D ACCEPTANCE
• REJECTION

DcoyfVrEA

hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER with modifications on attached Addendum.

Buyer's Signature/

Pate)

(Time)

(Buyer's Signature)

Pate)

(Time)

DOCUMENT RECEIPT
State Law requires Broker to furnish BuyerV^Seller with copies of this Agreement bearing all signatures. (One of the following alternatives must therefore be completed).
>A. D l acknowledge receipt of a final copy oMhe^Qregoing Agreement bearing ail signatures:

A ^

itofo

SIGNATURE OF BUYER

Date

B. D | personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures to be mailed on.
Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the • Seller Q Buyer. Sent by
r-age three of a four page form

mfttt"

J OOOiiU

A JTKORPT CF SIGNATORS. If Bu\
Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, or other entity, the person executln
or her authority to do so and to bind t>w/tr or Seller.

Agreement on its behalf warrants

_ COMPLETE AGREEMENT««- NO ORAL AGREEMENTS. This Instrument constitutes the entire agreement between the parties and supersedes and cancels any
z all prior negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings or agreements between the parties. There are no oral agreements which modily or alfect this agreent This Agreement cannot be changed except by mutual written agreement of the parties.
1 COUNTER OFFERS. Any counter offer made by Seller or Buyer shall be in wnting and, if attached hereto, shall Incorporate all the provisions of this Agreement
expressly modified or excluded therein.
DEFAULT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. In the event of default by Buyer. Seller may elect to either retain the earnest money as liquidated damages
nstitute suit to enforce any nghts of Seller. In the event of default by Seller, or if this sale fails to dose because of the nonsatisfaction of any %xptB9s condition
ontingency to which the sale is subject pursuant to this Agreement (other than by virtue of any default by Buyer), the earnest money deposit shall be returned to
er Both parties agree that should either party default in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained, the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses,
.ding a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by enable law. whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise. In the event the principal broke* holding the earnest money deposit is required to file an ineader action in court to resolve a dispute over the earnest money deposit niBmd to herein, the Buyer and Seller authorize the prindpal broker to draw from the
-est money deposit an amount necessary to advance the costs of bringing the interpleader action. The amount of deposit remaining after advancing those costs shall
-terpleaded into court in accordance with state law. The Buyer and Seller further agree that the defaulting party shall pay the court costs and reasonable attorney's
acurred by the prindpal broker in bringing such action.
ABROGATION. Except for.express warranties made In this Agreement, execution and delivery of final closing documents shall abrogate-this Agreement
RISK OF LOSS. All risk of loss or damage to the property shall be borne by the Seller until dosing. In the event there is loss or damage to the property between
rate hereof and the date of dosing, by reason of fire, vandalism, flood, earthquake, or acts of God. and the cost to repair such damage shall exceed ten percent
-s) of the purchase pnce of the property. Buyer may at his option either proceed with this transaction if Seller agrees m writing to repair or replace damaged property
to closing or declare this Agreement null and void. If damage to property is less than ten percent (10%) of the purchase price and Seller agrees in wnting to repair
olace and does actually repair and replace damaged property pnor to closing, this transaction shall proceed MS agreed.
TIME IS OF ESSENCE—UNAVOIDABLE DELAY. In the event that this sale cannot be closed by the date provided herein due to interruption of transport, strikes,
'iood. extreme weather, governmental regulations, delays caused by lender, acts of God, or similar occurrences beyond the control of Buyer or Seller, then the dosing
shall be extended SB^Bn (7) days beyond cessation of such condition, but in no event more than fifteen (15) days beyond the dosing date provided herein. Thereafter.
is of the essence. This provision relates only to the extension of closing dates. "Closing" shall mean the date on which all necessary instruments are signed and
ared by all parties to the transaction.
CLOSING COSTS. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half (!&) of the escrow closing fee. unless otherwise required by the lending institution. Costs of providing
~~urance or an abstract brought current shall be paid by Seller. Taxes and assessments for the current year, insurance, if acceptable to the Buyer, rents, and interest
„jmed obligations shall be proratedsas set forth in Section 8. Unearned deposits on tenancies and remaining mortgage or other reserves shall be assigned to Buyer
-sing.
=?EAL PROPERTY CONVEYANCING. If this agreement is for conveyance of fee title, title shall be conveyed by warranty deed free of defects other than those exd herein. If this Agreement is for sale or transfer of a Seller's interest under an existing real estate contract, Seller may transfer by either (a) spedal warranty deed,
imng Seller's assignment of said contract in form sufficient to convey after acquired title or (b) by a new real estate contract incorporating the said existing real
? contract therein.
pTICE. Unless otherwise provided in this Agreement, any notice expressly required by it must be given no later than two days after the occurrence or non-occurrence
event with respect to which notice is required. If any such timely required notice is not given, the contingency with respect to which the notice was to be given
omattcally terminated and this Agreement is in full force and effect If a person other than the Buyer or the Seller is designated to receive notice on behalf of the
or the Seller, notice to the person so designated shall be considered notice to the party designating that person for receipt of notice.
3ROKERAGE. For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term, "Brokerage" shall mean the respective listing or selling real estate office.
:AYS. For the purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term, ,4days" shall mean business or working days exclusive of legal holidays

FOUR OF A FOUR PAGE FORM.
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=ORM HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL - JULY 1 1987
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